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Is Common Environmental Content Feasible? 
Carolyn Fischer, Ian Parry, Francisco Aguilar, and Puja Jawahar 
for the Foreign Investment Advisory Service of the World Bank Group 
Abstract 
In a developing country context, a policy to promote adoption of common environmental content for 
corporate codes of conduct (COCs) aspires to meaningful results on two fronts. First, adherence to COC 
provisions should offer economic benefits that exceed the costs of compliance; i.e., companies must 
receive a price premium, market expansion, efficiency gains, subsidized technical assistance, or some 
combination of these benefits in return for meeting the requirements. Second, compliance should produce 
significant improvements in environmental outcomes; i.e., the code must impose real requirements, and 
monitoring and enforcement must offer sufficient incentives to prevent evasion. With those goals in mind, 
we explore options for establishing common environmental content in voluntary COCs. Because the 
benefits of a COC rest on its ability to signal information, we ground our analysis in a review of 
experiences with a broad range of voluntary (and involuntary) information-based programs: not only 
existing corporate COCs, but also the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) family of 
standards, ecolabels, and information disclosure programs. We find some important tradeoffs between 
harmonization, applicability, feasibility, and efficacy. 
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Is Common Environmental Content Feasible? 
Carolyn Fischer, Ian Parry, Francisco Aguilar, and Puja Jawahar  
for the Foreign Investment Advisory Service of the World Bank Group* 
1. Introduction 
Consumers, shareholders, local communities, and other stakeholders increasingly demand 
assurances that the production of goods in developing countries conforms to minimum standards 
of social and environmental responsibility (O’Rourke 2004). Defining such standards is a 
difficult task, because responsibility is a term subject to interpretation. Indeed, it can reflect a 
range of goals, from prohibiting abuse to adhering to local laws to promoting initiatives that 
improve conditions for health, safety, and the environment. Because developing countries often 
lack the administrative capacity to enforce regulations effectively, multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) are mounting their own efforts to design and enforce corporate codes of conduct (COCs) 
along their supply chain. However, these individual efforts on the part of corporations can lead to 
duplicate costs, lack of transparency and uniformity, and thereby lack of credibility. Thus, 
standardized environmental content for corporate COCs can offer a simple, cost-effective, and 
credible way for MNEs to implement corporate social responsibility (CSR). For suppliers of 
multiple MNEs, it can offer a streamlined set of requirements. Host-country economic ministries 
and industry groups could use simplified standards of conduct as a means to promote export-
oriented businesses to developed-country clients. Finally, standardization can allow third-party 
verifiers to apply their services to different companies and host countries. To be effective, the 
common environmental content must be rigorous enough to meet stakeholder needs, simple 
enough to be adopted, mindful of host countries’ and industries’ different needs, and in 
accordance with international norms and guidelines. 
                                                 
* The authors are grateful to the World Bank Group’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service for financial support 
and to Roger Sedjo for valuable comments. Fischer (corresponding author; fischer@rff.org) is a fellow and Parry 
(parry@rff.org) is a senior fellow in the Energy and Natural Resources Division, Resources for the Future (RFF). 
Aguilar (faguil1@ lsu.edu) is a Ph.D. candidate at the School of Renewable Natural Resources at Louisiana State 
University. Jawahar (jawahar@rff.org) is a research assistant at RFF. 
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Common content for COCs is being developed for labor according to International 
Labour Organization (ILO) standards, to which most countries adhere. However, environmental 
standards have no clearly articulated, internationally accepted consensus framework. This lack of 
convergence largely reflects a greater diversity in preferences for environmental standards and in 
circumstances. The actual impacts of emitted pollutants vary with geography, climate, and 
population exposure (greenhouse gases [GHGs] being the exception). Furthermore, in 
developing countries, the ecological and health risks that environmental regulations attempt to 
mitigate may be less of a national priority than poverty, basic health care, and education. 
Nonetheless, many countries lack the capacity to implement the environmental regulation 
that they would prefer. Even in many developed countries, where environmental regulatory 
structures are well established, agencies do not have the resources to cope with the sheer 
numbers of potentially hazardous substances. But problems are more chronic in developing 
countries, where agencies have even fewer resources and even shorter histories but still face 
immense challenges in monitoring pollution sources (Tietenberg 1998). Standardized 
environmental practices in a voluntary COC have the potential to serve host-country 
governments. To the extent they encourage the private sector to exploit opportunities for 
improving environmental performance, the local environment benefits without additional 
government expenditures. Information disclosure can also improve regulatory performance, by 
providing indicators of the severity of environmental problems and helping agencies prioritize 
their environmental problems and enforcement strategies.  
The demand for COCs by MNEs arises from concerns about environmental performance 
from consumers, investors, local communities, and the media. Different markets exhibit different 
preferences for environmentally benign behavior. The goal for some companies may be to avoid 
“environmental blacklisting” and the consumer outrage that might follow the discovery of 
egregious behavior by doing the bare minimum to meet compliance requirements. Other 
companies may actively court a niche market of “green” consumers with corporate standards 
above and beyond local compliance. 
Common environmental content for voluntary COCs therefore has the potential to serve 
the interests of both host countries and MNEs. This report explores what content is typically 
included and the feasibility of standardizing such content, at least for a given industry. 
To begin, we review the environmental sections of existing company COCs and evaluate 
whether and how convergence has emerged among companies. Section 2 documents the 
diversity in corporate practices and the frequent lack of specificity in environmental 
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requirements. In large part, this variety reflects a greater diversity in preferences for 
environmental performance, both from residents where production occurs and from consumers of 
the final products. Where common practices exist, they seem to arise in the form of process—as 
opposed to performance—guidelines, as in the implementation of environmental management 
systems (EMSs). Furthermore, few examples of monitoring and enforcement exist in these 
company-based efforts. 
In considering the possible ways forward, we draw on lessons from other programs for 
environmental certification and information disclosure. Section 3 discusses the guidelines for 
environmental practices and performance developed by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO).1 Section 4 explores various consumer-product ecolabeling schemes 
around the world to draw lessons about managing supply chains for sustainability goals—and 
premium prices. These labels are generally designed to reflect practices above and beyond 
regulatory standards in developed countries, which are not necessarily appropriate for 
widespread application in developing-country sectors, except for certain niche products. Some 
sectors, including chemicals and forest products, have their own certification programs that can 
offer lessons for standard setting and third-party enforcement. For example, in an RFF discussion 
paper (Fischer et al. 2005), we present a case study of the forestry sector to document the 
diversity of goals, the challenges of certification, and the relevance of demand-side issues. We 
identify common methods and requirements for compliance and certification, evaluate their costs 
and effectiveness, and determine which might be applicable for common environmental content 
in a meaningful COC. 
Ensuring the credibility of standards requires reliable and regular verification. 
Admittedly, this kind of enforcement is lacking in most corporate COCs, but examples exist in 
voluntary programs sponsored by third parties or governments. A first step toward meaningful 
enforcement involves monitoring and information provision—a necessary foundation for 
verifying compliance with any standard, be it host-country regulations or corporate conduct 
codes. Some studies have shown that required reports alone can have significant impacts on 
reducing emissions, perhaps by galvanizing consumers’ or shareholders’ concerns about risks or 
by helping managers identify emissions-saving opportunities. In Section 5, we discuss existing 
                                                 
1 ISO is an international nongovernmental network of the national standards institutes of 148 countries; its central 
secretariat is in Geneva, Switzerland. ISO was created in 1947 after a meeting in London, U.K., where delegates 
from 25 countries came together to facilitate the international coordination and unification of industrial standards. 
3 Resources for the Future  Fischer, Parry, Aguilar, and Jawahar 
reporting mechanisms like the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) in the United States; Indonesia’s 
Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation, and Rating; and other pollutant-release and -transfer 
registries being developed around the world. 
Drawing on these lessons, we make present some guidelines and tradeoffs for developing 
common environmental content for COCs in Section 6. To be generally applicable, a set of 
feasible common provisions must focus on process and principles rather than performance. More 
specific environmental content—including performance measures—would need to be determined 
by industry, if not also by country. Consequently, before proceeding with designing common 
content, choices must be made regarding the appropriate scope of the environmental content, the 
target industry, the relative importance of economic and environmental goals, and the partners 
available to help implement the program. Section 7 offers brief conclusions. 
2. Current State of Environmental Content in Corporate COCs 
The World Bank Group commissioned the law firm Foley Hoag to survey company 
practices in seven sectors: apparel, footwear, light manufacturing, agribusiness, tourism, oil, and 
mining. We draw on the results from its survey, Company Codes of Conduct and International 
Standards: An Analytical Comparison (Smith and Feldman 2003), to gauge emerging trends 
among companies that adopt socially responsible practices. It is important to note that the Foley 
Hoag study surveyed only publicly available information (i.e., websites and annual reports) of 
the firms chosen to represent each given industry; the result is a compilation of company 
policies. A follow-up study (Smith and Feldman, forthcoming) was commissioned to consider 
the degree to which the stated policies are monitored or enforced by a third party. 
Using the database that is a product of the Foley Hoag effort, we analyze the 
environmental portions of the COCs within the seven sectors to discern certain commonalities 
and divergences from which we can draw conclusions. Of the seven industries surveyed, apparel, 
footwear, and light manufacturing constitute one type of industry. Agribusiness is a classification 
in itself, oil and mining fall in the natural resources category, and tourism can be classified as a 
quasi-service industry. The survey uses several criteria to evaluate a company’s environmental 
policy, including materials, emissions, pollution control and hazardous substances, waste 
management, packaging and transport, and biodiversity. 
In the next three tables, we list the main points for each criterion in each of the seven 
industries. Looking at the industry–criteria matrix, we see that the environmental content varies 
considerably across the seven sectors, reflecting differences in production processes and factors 
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of production. Within sectors, environmental management initiatives can also range widely, 
particularly in the more diverse industries. However, some industry groups have developed their 
own standards for behavior, and several sectors require EMSs that incorporate standards and 
practices from the ISO 14000 series. 
Apparel and footwear are labor-intensive industries, and the main inputs are not 
inherently toxic. For the most part, their environmental requirements are bundled into health and 
safety standards. For instance, the Clean Clothes Campaign states that “a safe and hygienic 
working environment shall be provided, and best occupational health and safety practice shall be 
promoted, bearing in mind the prevailing knowledge of the industry and of any specific hazards” 
(Smith and Feldman 2003). It does not define a specific environmental policy. Likewise, Nike’s 
environmental goals are incorporated into its Management, Environment, Safety, and Health 
(MESH) program. 
However, individual firms within the sample studied have taken some initiatives to 
address environmental concerns. Gap, another clothing manufacturer, requires its factories to 
have an EMS or environmental management plan in place and to comply with local 
environmental laws and regulations. Several factories are located in countries with lax 
environmental regulations, and in that case Gap factories are “encouraged” to meet the standards 
outlined in the Gap statement of environmental principles. Because the business model of the 
garment and footwear industry is based on outsourcing, several companies (e.g., H&M, Adidas–
Salomon) make a mention of sourcing products from “green” suppliers, but the requirements 
tend to be vague. 
In contrast, firms in the light-manufacturing sector are more likely to define an 
environmental management agenda. Most firms surveyed have comprehensive EMSs that 
address hazardous substances, nonrenewable resources, waste management, packaging, and 
transport; however, they do not tend to address biodiversity or carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. 
As seen in the Table 1 matrix, because light manufacturing is more likely to deal with materials 
that are inherently toxic and to have production processes that are polluting, most of the 
companies surveyed address these environmental concerns. Leading the way is IKEA, a Swedish 
furniture manufacturing company that has developed a comprehensive environmental policy that 
is articulated in a statement called “The IKEA Way”: “We always strive to minimize any 
possible damaging effects to the environment, which may result as a consequence of our 
activities. Therefore, IKEA and its suppliers shall continuously reduce the environmental 
impacts of operations.” IKEA subjects its suppliers to the same standards to which it subjects  
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Table 1: Summary of Environmental Code of Conduct Statements:  
Apparel, Footwear, and Light Manufacturing 
Industry Apparel  Footwear  Light  Manufacturing 
General policy 
statement 
Although some companies (e.g., Marks & Spencer 
and Adidas) have specific EMSs, the apparel and 
footwear industries do not have a comprehensive 
environmental policy statement. Environmental 
policies fall under the rubric of health and safety 
standards for workers. 
Plastics and light manufacturing sectors 
have comprehensive EMSs that address 
aspects of production that affect the 
environment (e.g., “The IKEA Way” 
and “The Lego Fundamental Principle” 
emphasize a cradle-to-grave life-cycle 
approach). 
Materials  Some companies 
emphasize the use of 
renewable resources for 
raw materials (e.g., H&M 
and Marks & Spencer). 
NA  Some companies have rules regarding 
use of hazardous substances and 
nonrenewable resources (e.g., IKEA 
discourages the use of wood from intact 
forests). 
Emissions  NA  Policies to reduce CFCs, 
VOCs, and other toxic 
emissions during the 
production process have 
emerged (e.g., Nike, 






No policies specific to 
pollution control; 
however, some firms are 
phasing out hazardous 
chemicals (e.g., Marks & 
Spencer).  
The industry is phasing 
out PVC and reducing 
exposure to chemicals 
(e.g., Nike and Reebok). 
 
Many toxic chemicals used in this 
sector are regulated nationally and 
internationally (e.g., the Montreal 
Protocol). Some companies have 
additional policies attractive to their 
consumers (e.g., children’s toy 
manufacturer Lego uses printing ink 





policy; some support of 
recycling (e.g., Gap, as 
part of its employee 
policy, encourages the 
purchase of products with 
high postconsumer 
recycled matter). 
No specific strategy, but 
some company-specific 
efforts (e.g., Timberland 
resells unused leather). 
Some companies have a comprehensive 
waste management policy (e.g., Lego 




NA  A trend toward reducing 
or using recycled 
packaging is noticeable 
(e.g., Timberland uses 
100% postconsumer 
recycled packaging). 
Some companies use environmentally 
friendly packaging and emphasize 
minimum resource use (e.g., Lego). 
 
Biodiversity  NA NA NA 
Note: NA = criterion was not covered in the survey, or there are no trends to display. 
Source: Smith and Feldman (2003). 
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Table 3 (found on page 10) summarizes the Foley Hoag findings for the natural resource-based 
sectors of agriculture and tourism. The agribusiness industry covers a broad range of businesses, 
including farms, food-processing industries, retailers, and restaurants. Each of these sub-
industries has similar environmental COC principles. For instance, in the farming sector, 
Chiquita requires each business unit to have an EMS in place to properly identify priorities, Dole 
ensures that its EMS programs conform with developing international standards, and Del Monte 
monitors environmental performance and integrates environmental considerations into business 
decisions and planning activities. 
Starbucks, Nestlé, and Procter & Gamble all seek to develop or have developed EMSs to 
be compatible with voluntary standards such as ISO 14001. Having franchises all across the 
world, McDonald’s aims to develop an EMS that would work irrespective of the country in 
which the franchise is based. Although these major brands have an interest in protecting their 
goodwill, others are courting premium niche markets. Organic and fair trade certifications are 
becoming increasingly popular in the agribusiness industry, particularly in small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
The tourism industry depends on the natural environment, directly or indirectly. As  
a consequence, industry groups have developed comprehensive sets of standards that, though  
not mandatory, provide a framework for firms in the industry. These include the World  
Tourism Organization’s (WTO’s) Global Code of Ethics for Tourism, the International 
Ecotourism Standard, Green Globe 21 (which has the license for distribution and management  
of the International Ecotourism Standard), the Blue Flag Campaign, and the Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) Principles. Most major companies  
have EMSs. 
7 Resources for the Future  Fischer, Parry, Aguilar, and Jawahar 
Table 2: Summary of Environmental Code of Conduct Statements:  
Agriculture, Tourism, and Resource-Based Sectors 
Sector Agribusiness  Tourism 
General policy 
statement 
More companies are adopting EMSs, 
ISO 14000 standards, or sector-
specific programs (e.g., Flower Label 
Program, Better Banana Project, Fair 
Trade, certified organic labeling). 
Most companies surveyed have EMSs. 
Industry-specific codes include Green Globe 
21 and the International Ecotourism Standard. 
Materials  Variable codes point to no 
discernable trend.  
NA 
Emissions  Industry largely ignores emissions, 
but Nestlé and Procter & Gamble 
optimize shipments to reduce 
emissions. 
Airline industry has no comprehensive policy 
addressing emissions, but some individual 
efforts (e.g., British Airways). Hospitality 
industry promotes efficient hotels (e.g., 
Hilton’s eco-room or “conservation for 
tomorrow”) and and cruise ships (e.g., Royal 






Rainforest Alliance requires that all 
pesticides be registered before use. 
Cut Flower Code and the Flower 
Label Program also address the issue. 





Banana industry is reducing plastics 
use. Some companies are returning 
unused chemicals. Starbucks is 
introducing consumer-level policies 





Biodiversity  This concern arises sporadically in 
agribusiness. The U.K. banana 
industry’s Code of Best Practice and 
the Flower Label Program dictate 
certain cropping patterns. Starbucks 
rewards farmers who conserve and 
improve soil structure. 
Several tourism operators have established 
conservation funds (e.g., Green Globe 21). 
Note: NA = criterion was not covered in the survey, or there are no trends to display. 
Source: Smith and Feldman (2003). 
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Table 3 summarizes the survey’s findings for the extractive resource sectors, oil and gas 
production and mining. Although several companies in the oil and gas sector have COCs that 
provide a general, overarching statements supporting “a safe and healthy working environment,” 
environmental commitments are rarely stated in company policy; rather, environmental activities 
tend to be reported after the fact, in annual reports. Some companies, like Eni and Norsk Hydro 
use ISO 14001 standards for EMS requirements or as a guideline for their environmental policy. 
However, some companies have designed programs that specifically address environmental 
issues. For example, Exxon Mobil established its Operations Integrity Management System, 
which they assert meets “the intent and requirement of ISO 14001,” to “ensure that 
environmental considerations are addressed in all operations.”  
The mining industry has a basic COC given by the Principles for the Conduct of 
Company Operations within the minerals industry, produced by the Mineral Policy Institute. 
Having said this, most companies prefer instead to have their EMS in line with ISO 14000 
standards and have their environmental policies integrated with worker health and safety 
standards. In these respects, the environmental polices within the mining industry are very 
similar to those in the oil and gas industry. Transport is a major part of the postproduction 
activity of oil and mining companies; hence, both industries have policies that deal with 
accidental hazards during transportation. Oil and mining companies, responsible for significant 
emissions of GHGs, have policies to reduce emissions by eliminating gas flaring and to improve 
monitoring; however, we should note that the rise in natural gas prices is itself making flaring 
unattractive. Recognizing that mining and oil drilling can cause habitat destruction and 
biodiversity loss, companies are beginning to form policies that address these problems. 
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Table 3: Summary of Environmental Code of Conduct Statements:  
Agriculture, Tourism, and Resource-Based Sectors 
Sector Oil  Mining 
General policy 
statement 
Environmental reporting is included 
in annual reports and statements of 
emissions. Environmental concerns 
are included under the rubric of health 
and safety. Companies are starting to 
adopt EMSs, as per ISO 14000 
standards.  
Most companies support safe and healthy 
working environments and promise future 
ISO 14001 compliance. The Mineral Policy 
Institute has published principles of conduct 
that address environmental issues. 
Materials  NA  Companies are beginning to emphasize water 
conservation and address pollution concerns. 
Emissions  Industry seeks to increase energy 
efficiency and reduce or eliminate gas 
flaring. 
Industry seeks to increase energy efficiency 
and reduce GHG emissions. A GHG 
“challenge program” requires companies to 
report progress in reducing CO2 emissions 
and to implement air emissions management 
plans. National Mining Association supports 





Oil spills during transport is a 
pollution concern. Industry is partly 
regulated by the Basel Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal. 
Mineral Policy Institute recommends that 
companies mining high-sulfide ore prevent 
acid mine drainage, that no uranium should be 
involved, and that all environmental costs 
should be borne by the polluter or generator. 
Waste 
management 
Most oil companies are attempting to 
reduce waste discharges through 
reducing inputs, recycling, and 
treatment techniques. 
Mineral Policy Institute encourages reports on 
recycling metal products.  
Packaging and 
transport 
Some companies have stringent rules 
on the age and condition of oil 
tankers, intended to reduce risk of 
spills. 
Mineral Policy Institute urges companies to 
plan for accidents and environmental 
emergencies, including during off-site 
activities such as transport. 
Biodiversity  Some companies are incorporating 
biodiversity issues into company 
policy (e.g., Shell’s biodiversity 
standard; OECD guidelines state that 
the same policies apply to third-party 
suppliers). 
Some companies are beginning to address 
biodiversity issues. 
Note: NA = criterion was not covered in the survey, or there are no trends to display. 
Source: Smith and Feldman (2003). 
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In addition to the diversity in enunciated standards, an important issue is whether any of 
the guidelines are followed and enforced. Hence, the World Bank Group commissioned Foley 
Hoag to examine and evaluate the structures that the firms have put in place to implement their 
CSR codes in a follow-up study (Smith and Feldman, Forthcoming). Although most of the 
information on company codes (used for the first study) was publicly available, most companies 
do not publicly disclose their implementation mechanisms. Foley Hoag thus conducted a series 
of in-depth interviews with experts on the five-targeted industries. 
Like COCs, implementation mechanisms vary across and within industries. Most 
companies in the apparel, footwear, and light manufacturing industries use relatively vague 
language about providing “a safe and healthy work environment” for employees but do not 
specify the particular environmental standards that they intend to meet. Internal compliance 
audits tend to focus on labor aspects and rarely include a formal assessment of environmental 
factors. Even in companies that have more highly developed environmental standards, it remains 
unclear how these standards are applied to their dispersed suppliers. 
Unlike many of the companies in the apparel, footwear, and light manufacturing 
industries, which wrap environmental standards into broader health and safety standards, those in 
the agribusiness sector typically have more comprehensive and specific environmental CSR 
standards. With regard to other internal mechanisms in place to gauge environmental 
implementation, many large MNEs have put in place environmental departments that are in 
charge of implementing standards. Most agribusiness companies have conducted at least internal 
environmental audits of their farms, and many have sought to obtain certification under ISO 
guidelines. Dole Food Company, Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., and Nestlé S.A. all refer in 
their publicly available materials to obtaining certification under ISO 14001 for EMSs in place at 
their farms or processing factories. Others partner with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
to monitor local practices (Fair Trade and the Rainforest Alliance–certified shade-grown coffee, 
for example). 
The tourism industry relies on environmental self-audits to monitor its compliance  
to stated COCs. With respect to implementation, the WTO’s Global Code of Ethics for Tourism 
provides only that “the public and private stakeholders in tourism development should  
cooperate in the implementation of these principles and monitor their effective application.”  
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The performance of Green Globe 21–certified companies is independently assessed through 
regular on-site assessments.2 
Among leading MNEs in the extractive sector, some companies have comprehensive 
Health Safety Environment site inspections and audits that include annual self-assessments, 
annual management reviews of existing systems, and independent auditors at least once every 
three years. In addition, several external companies conduct audits to determine compliance with 
ISO 14001 and other international standards. Some of the independent companies used by 
extractive industry companies to certify environmental standards include 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Arthur D. Little. 
Despite the differences among the industries surveyed, we find some common features: 
•  Almost all the companies surveyed have taken voluntary measures to introduce 
environmental content in their COCs. However, because the study selected a major 
MNEs with CSR policies for the survey, it is unclear how indicative these 
observations are of the industries overall. 
•  Industry-wide bodies such as ecotourism organizations and the Mineral Policy 
Institute have played an important part in constructing frameworks for environmental 
performance. These organizations formulate industry-specific standards and COCs 
and act as information clearinghouses. Their standards are particularly useful to small 
companies that do not have the resources to create independent EMSs. 
•  Firms across all industries contract some production processes (components, 
packaging) outside the firm. Most request that their suppliers meet certain 
environmental standards (often referred to as “green procurement”). Such standards 
are part of most EMSs and the ISO 14001 standards. They may also be a requirement 
of consumer country laws and environmental labeling schemes. 
                                                 
2 Green Globe was developed by the World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC) in 1993 and was officially launched 
in 1994 as a membership- and commitment-based program. It was expanded in 1999 with the introduction of the 
Green Globe 21 Standard. The program was revised in 2001 and expanded to include actual measurement of 
environmental improvements through annual benchmarking. Green Globe 21 now has four standards that contain the 
environmental and social performance requirements of Green Globe 21 Program participants: Company, 
Community, International Ecotourism, and Design & Construct. Green Globe currently operates in 54 countries 
where on-site third-party assessment is carried out by AJA Registrars, Grupo Mendez Nava, or GTCertification 
Ltda, Holar Agricultural College (Green Globe 21 2004). 
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•  International environmental treaties like the Basel Convention3 and the Montreal 
Protocol4 provide an impetus for consideration, even though they are not directly 
responsible for increasing EMSs within the production process. Under these treaties, 
international trade in toxic and ozone-depleting chemicals is strictly regulated. If and 
when the Kyoto Protocol for GHG reduction becomes binding for certain developed 
countries, it may foster demand for CSR practices that minimize those emissions. 
•  Almost all the industries surveyed encourage some form of the four Rs—reduce, 
reuse, recycle, and recover—in resource use and waste management. 
•  Although environmental statements affirm good practices, actual requirements are 
relatively vague, particularly compared with those for labor issues. Stipulations for 
enforcement are more rare. 
•  Where requirements are more substantial, they tend first and foremost to involve 
having an EMS in place. Where explicit external mechanisms exist for verifying 
environmental implementation, the ISO 14000 series usually sets the standards. 
In summary, it is not surprising that different industries make different stipulations 
regarding environmental practices in their COCs, given that the key environmental concerns will 
                                                 
3 A central goal of the Basel Convention is the application of environmentally sound management (ESM), which is 
intended to protect human health and the environment by minimizing hazardous waste production whenever 
possible. ESM addresses the issue of waste through an integrated life-cycle approach, which involves strong controls 
for hazardous waste, from generation to storage, transport, treatment, reuse, recycling, recovery, and final disposal. 
One of the guiding principles of the Basel Convention is that hazardous wastes should be dealt with as close to 
where they are produced as possible. Hazardous and other wastes can be moved across boundaries only with prior 
written notification by the exporting state to the competent authorities of the importing and transit states (if 
appropriate). Each shipment of waste must be accompanied by a document from the point at which a transboundary 
movement begins to the point of disposal. Hazardous waste shipments made without such movement documents are 
illegal. In addition, the export of such wastes to certain countries is banned outright. Transboundary movements can 
take place, however, if the exporting state does not have the ability to manage or dispose of the waste in an 
environmentally sound manner. 
4 The Montreal Protocol of 1987 required industrialized countries to reduce their consumption of chemicals that 
harm the ozone layer. As of September 2002, 183 countries had ratified the Montreal Protocol, which established the 
time schedule to “freeze” and reduce consumption of ozone-depleting substances (ODSs). The Montreal Protocol 
requires all parties to ban exports and imports of controlled ODSs to and from nonparties. The production and 
consumption of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ODSs have been phased out in industrialized countries, and a 
schedule is in place to eliminate the use of methyl bromide, a pesticide and agricultural fumigant. Developing 
countries operate under different phaseout schedules, having been given a grace period before phaseout measures 
would apply to them because of their need for industrial development and their relatively low production rate and 
use of ODSs. 
13 Resources for the Future  Fischer, Parry, Aguilar, and Jawahar 
vary according to the materials and processes used, the supply chain structure, consumer 
awareness, and consumer ability to discriminate. Perhaps more surprising is the degree of 
reliance on EMSs—particularly the conformance to ISO 14001 standards—to the exclusion of 
actual performance criteria. 
In several places in the Foley Hoag report (Smith and Feldman 2003) —and for several 
industries—they make the nearly identical notation: 
One clear trend apparent in all these codes is that many firms increasingly use and 
implement Environmental Management Systems. As the IFC [International 
Finance Corporation] states in its Handbook (IFC 2004), EMSs such as ISO 
14001 are seen as mechanisms for achieving improvements in environmental 
performance and for supporting the trade prospects of “clean” firms. Additionally, 
manufacturers almost uniformly mandate compliance with any applicable 
environmental regulations and laws, and also almost uniformly provide a safe and 
healthy working environment. (Smith and Feldman 2003, pp. 13 and 24 in Part I, 
and pp. 14 and 42 in Part II) 
Because of the increasing popularity of ISO 14001, we discuss its requirements and 
certification in detail in the next section. We note that it involves EMS implementation and 
adherence to self-designed performance guidelines, not an externally recognized performance 
standard. In a sense, the convergence that we observe in environmental practices is toward a 
management philosophy or process rather than a particular behavior or outcome. This kind of 
emphasis allows for the tailoring of environmental practices to individual sectors and, indeed, 
individual firms; however, while such flexibility is necessary for environmental standards of 
conduct to be relevant, it seems to come at the cost of an absence of clear, enforceable 
performance metrics. 
In addition to existing corporate COCs, other templates for voluntary mechanisms can 
promote better environmental performance and improve access to markets that contain 
environmentally conscious consumers. These programs, increasingly prevalent in developed 
countries, are important as models for environmental conduct and for understanding the demand 
for better, credible conduct from supplier companies in developing countries. We next review 
EMS certification programs, since they form part of so many corporate COCs.  
3. EMS Certification Programs 
In considering the possible ways forward, we first look at current reporting and 
certification experiences. Because the ISO 14000 body of standards is rapidly becoming a 
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framework for environmental management, auditing, and labeling, we investigate its 
requirements and relevance for standardizing environmental content in corporate COCs. We also 
survey emerging evidence about the costs and benefits of ISO 14001 certification. 
ISO 14000 Family of Standards 
Following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992 (commonly referred to as the Earth Summit), ISO 
introduced its 14000 series for environmental management. The ISO 14000 body of standards 
allows organizations to focus environmental efforts according to internationally accepted criteria. 
The standards are designed to be “generic,” applying to all types and sizes of 
organizations, public or private, whatever the product or service. They are also designed to 
encompass diverse geographical, cultural, and social conditions. The ISO 14001 standard, which 
sets out principles for EMSs, does not establish absolute requirements for environmental 
performance, only a commitment to continual improvement and compliance with applicable 
legislation and regulations. Therefore, organizations engaged in similar activities may have 
different EMSs and performance, yet all may comply with ISO 14001. The ISO standards are 
thus flexible across firms, because firms determine the extent of coverage. The standards may 
include the organization’s products, services, activities, operations, facilities, transportation, or 
any aspect of production but must be sufficiently consequential to justify certification. 
To illustrate the scope of ISO standard-setting related to environmental conduct,  
Table 8 in the Appendix lists the current series of ISO 14000 family of standards. The 14020 
series covers ecolabeling, and the 14040 series covers life-cycle assessment (LCA), which we 
discuss later. 
ISO standards are voluntary, and conformity with ISO 14001 is the most common 
certification sought. The role of an EMS is to minimize harmful effects on the environment 
caused by the organization’s activities. For an EMS to comply with ISO 14001, the organization 
must have an environmental policy that 
•  is fully supported by senior management and accessible to the staff and public, 
•  pledges compliance with environmental legislation that applies to the organization, 
and 
•  stresses a commitment to continuous improvement. 
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Note that these requirements are similar to the general statements of conduct with respect 
to the environment in some corporate COCs, including “the IKEA way.”  
Even though the ISO 14001 program requires documented proof of compliance with 
national environmental quality standards, several firms are being granted ISO 14001, bilateral 
certification, or both ahead of full compliance by demonstrating partial compliance or intent to 
comply (ISO 2004a). 
ISO does not audit and certify management systems itself; instead, independent 
certification bodies handle verification. Although the certifiers do not operate on its behalf, ISO 
publishes guidelines on conformity assessment to promote convergence among national 
practices. Several certification bodies exist, and many operate across national boundaries. 
Until recently, ISO certification had penetrated much further in developed countries than 
in developing ones, with Japan leading the pack by far. However, at the end of 2003, China was 
estimated to have the second-largest number of ISO 14001–certified companies. Many 
companies were also becoming certified in newly industrialized countries, Thailand, Brazil, 
India, and the new member countries of the European Union.5 
Benefits of ISO 14001 Certification 
Despite the rapid diffusion of ISO 14001, only a few studies have analyzed the standard’s 
performance. Researchers at the University of North Carolina (UNC) conducted an empirical 
assessment of the impacts of EMSs in the United States using the National Database on EMS 
(UNC 2003). That pilot study collected longitudinal data on 83 facilities from 20 business 
sectors and included publicly traded, privately held, and government facilities, with organization 
sizes ranging from major manufacturers to small independent businesses. Roughly two-thirds of 
the facilities were registered or intended to seek ISO 14001 registration, whereas the rest were 
using the ISO 14001 framework to guide their efforts but did not intend to seek registration. 
UNC found that, on balance, EMS introduction was associated with overall improvements in 
reported environmental performance. However, impacts specific to ISO 14001certification were 
harder to discern. 
                                                 
5 Data collected by Reinhard Peglau, Federal Environmental Agency, Germany, and ISO World 
(http://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14k.htm); see also Khwaja et al. 2003. 
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Because EMSs designed using the ISO 14001 voluntary standard as a model must  
include specific objectives and targets for improvement, they tested whether environmental 
performance improvements were greater for those priority indicators. Although observations 
suggest this result, the difference was not statistically significant. Nor were the performance 
changes and the compliance of those facilities intending to seek ISO 14001 certification 
statistically different from the others. Although a notable share of the facilities that had 
violations during the baseline period did reduce or eliminate them after EMS implementation,  
on a statistical basis, EMS introduction or ISO certification did not have a significant effect on 
regulatory compliance (UNC 2003). 
Although largely unquantified, the perceived benefits included increased management 
efficiency (the most widely reported benefit), increased operational efficiency, reduced liability, 
regulatory benefits, improved community relations, and improved relationships with customers 
and suppliers. Of the facilities that reported quantified benefits, the average benefits were 
$90,320, of which 57% was savings from reduced materials use.6 
Another important question is how the market values ISO certification. Hibiki et al. 
(2003) used data on Japanese publicly held manufacturers to evaluate empirically the likelihood 
of and the potential benefits of acquiring an ISO 14001 certificate. They find that firms with a 
larger size, larger export ratio, higher profitability, and higher expenditures for research and 
development have greater incentives to get certified. Firms in certain industries—
pharmaceutical, metals, transportation equipment, precision machinery, and other manufacturing 
industries—were less likely to seek certification. More importantly, the ISO 14001 certification 
system appears to contribute to a statistically significant increase (11–14%) in the market value 
of the firms in the manufacturing industry, suggesting that the stock market gives publicly held 
firms an incentive to acquire the ISO 14001 certificate. 
Critics of ISO 14001 certification like Boiral and Sala (1998) note that environmental 
performance improvements are not guaranteed by EMS implementation. Furthermore, the ISO 
management strategy may not be compatible with all internal management cultures, and some 
                                                 
6 These results are similar to case studies in Khwaja et al. 2003. For instance, the agricultural residue–based pulp 
and paper mill Raval Paper Mills (Rae Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, India) was one of the demonstration units in the 
Demonstration in Small Industries for Reducing Emissions (DESIRE) cleaner production program sponsored by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Execution of the cleaner production techniques 
created numerous benefits for the firm; the investment of US$80,000 made in implementing the first 30 measures 
generated savings of US$88,000 per year.  
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empirical studies have validated the role of internal management philosophies. Examining the 
motivation of early ISO adopters, Nakamura et al. (2001) find that the environmental values, 
beliefs, and attitudes of managers are as important determinants as the costs and benefits of 
voluntary actions to enhance or protect the environment and the capacity to act. The critics also 
note that certification can be quite costly. Similarly, Bridgen and Helm (2000) caution that ISO 
14001 certification is most relevant for companies that already incorporate environmental 
consciousness in their corporate culture and is not effective for companies that are poor 
environmental performers. 
Costs of ISO 14001 Certification 
The costs of ISO 14001 implementation and certification can vary greatly depending on 
the size of a facility and the nature of its operation. For a small to medium-sized manufacturing 
facility (i.e., 100–300 employees), the cost of developing and auditing an EMS will generally 
range from $20,000 to $50,000, according to Environmental International Ltd. (2003). Table 4 
lists estimated costs of ISO 14001 implementation and certification for different manufacturing 
facilities in the United States. 
Table 4: Summary of Estimated Costs of ISO Implementation and Certification for 
Various Industrial Facilities in the United States 
Plant Size  Costs of ISO Implementation and 
Certification 
Average manufacturing facility: 100–300 employees $20,000–$50,000 
Chemical manufacturer: 120 employees  $30,000 (2-year period) 
Manufacturer of water quality measurement equipment: 300 
employees 
$20,000–$30,000 (2-year period) 
Major plastics producer with facilities in various states 
(Delaware, Louisiana, and Texas) 
>$100,000 per facility 
Source: Environmental International Ltd. 2003. 
UNC (2003) also estimate EMS design, implementation, and certification costs. They 
find that publicly traded facilities experienced lower total costs, whereas government facilities 
spent the most. Labor costs for government facilities were 2.6 times more than for privately 
owned companies and 4.1 times more than for publicly traded facilities; consulting costs formed 
yet higher proportions. They submit that the large cost differences arise from differences in 
access to internal capabilities and resources. 
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Table 5: Costs of EMS Design per Employee by Ownership Type 
 
Source: UNC 2003 
Of course, it is unclear to what extent U.S. figures are representative of the costs in a 
developing-country context. An analysis by de Bonafos (2001) presents a case study of a 
privately held Chilean forestry company that manages a total 82,564 hectares of pine plantations. 
The company started the ISO 14001 certification process in 1995 and obtained certification in 
1997. Table 6 lists total direct costs (evaluation audit, certification audit, external audit control, 
fees for external and internal consultant work, and courses and seminars) incurred in the process 
of implementing and operating an EMS system according to the ISO 14001 standard. Notice that 
the costs involved in hiring external consultants accounted for more than 47% of total direct 
costs. This value is even higher than the 36.3% reported by UNC (2003) for government 
facilities, whereas internal costs are much lower. 
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Table 6: Direct Costs Incurred in the Adoption of Standard ISO 14001 by a Forestry 
Company in Chile 
 
Item  Compounded Total Direct Costs
a 
(US$, December 2000) 
Percentage (%) 
Evaluation audit  19,038.08  10.04 
Certification audit  35,502.20  18.71 
External audit control  25,567.50  13.48 
External consultants  90,621.94  47.77 
Internal consultants  9,847.35  5.18 
Courses and seminars  9,137.36  4.82 
Total 189,714.43  100.00 
 a Direct costs consist of the evaluation audit, certification audit, external audit control, fees for external and internal 
consultant work, and courses and seminars. Data were collected from 1996 to 2000 and compounded to December 
2000. 
Source: de Bonafos 2001. 
De Bonafos (2001) estimated that the direct costs of ISO 14001 implementation per 
employee for this Chilean forestry company were US$220.70, less than half that of the privately 
held firms in UNC 2003 and even somewhat lower than the values reported for publicly traded 
facilities. However, in Chile, that per-employee figure represents roughly 5% of annual per 
capita income (data from Chile Data Profile, World Bank Group). They also estimate annual 
benefits of $823 per employee; about 5% was from reduced chemicals use, 20% from lower 
administration costs, and 75% from personnel savings (primarily contractors). Though 
intriguing, lack of detail in the de Bonafos (2001) study summary and its single firm sample 
make it difficult to draw hard conclusions. 
Both of these studies reveal that large portions of the costs arise from external trainers, 
consultants, and auditors. The expansion of such capacity in developing countries to replace 
international consultants would bring down certification costs. Still, these costs will remain a 
greater barrier for developing country firms. Given that compliance and certification costs are 
fixed, up-front expenses, credit-constrained companies in developing countries may have 
difficulty obtaining the resources for certification, even if it may confer financial benefits later. 
Our case study of the forestry industry reveals that most organizations that have obtained 
ecocertification have done so with international financial assistance (Fischer et al. 2005). 
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Other EMS Certification Programs 
Life-Cycle Analysis 
Life-cycle analysis (LCA) is a cradle-to-grave approach for assessing industrial systems. 
A product’s life cycle starts when raw materials are extracted from the earth; continues through 
manufacturing, transport, and use; and ends with waste management, which includes recycling 
and final disposal (UNEP 2003). By including all impacts throughout a life cycle, LCA provides 
a comprehensive view of the environmental aspects of a product or process and a more accurate 
picture of the total environmental trade-offs in product or process selection (USEPA and SAIC 
2001). The commonly used life-cycle impact categories include potential contributions to global 
warming (e.g., carbon dioxide [CO2] emissions); stratospheric ozone depletion (from chemicals 
like CFCs); acidification (e.g., sulfur dioxide [SO2] and nitrogen oxides [NOx]); eutrophication 
(as from phosphate and nitrates); photochemical smog (hydrocarbons); terrestrial and aquatic 
toxicity, as well as human health impacts (from toxic chemical releases); resource depletion 
(e.g., use of minerals and fossil fuels); and land use (e.g., solid waste).7 ISO has standardized an 
LCA framework within the ISO 14040 series.  
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
Working in parallel with ISO, the European Union has developed the Eco-Management 
and Audit Scheme (EMAS), a management tool for companies and other organizations to 
evaluate, report, and improve their environmental performance. The scheme has been available 
for company participation since 1995 and was originally restricted to companies in industrial 
sectors.8 Since 2001, EMAS has been open to all economic sectors, including public and private 
services.9 Three measures have contributed to the effectiveness of EMAS: the integration of 
EN/ISO 14001 as the EMS required by EMAS, the adoption of a logo to signal EMAS 
registration to the outside world, and the mandate to consider indirect environmental effects such 
as those related to financial services or administrative and planning decisions. Participation is 
voluntary and extends to public or private organizations operating in the European Union and the 
European economic area (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). An increasing number of 
                                                 
7 Source: U.S. EPA 1998b. 
8 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1836/93 of 29 June 1993. 
9 Regulation (EC) No 761/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2001. 
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candidate countries are also implementing the scheme in preparation for joining the European 
Union. This broadening system indicates not only widespread convergence to the ISO body of 
standards but, along with recent European Parliament recommendations for promoting CSR 
(European Parliament 2003), increasing demand for compliant behavior among source 
companies outside the European Union. 
Responsible Care 
Responsible Care is an example of a sector-based voluntary program for environmental 
responsibility, although its success remains under debate. Canada’s Chemical Producer 
Association (CCPA) developed Responsible Care in 1985. The American Chemistry Council 
established the American chapter of the Responsible Care program in 1988 as a voluntary effort 
to achieve “improvements in environmental, health, and safety performance beyond levels 
required by the U.S. government.” (American Chemistry Council website). The program 
integrated ISO 14001 into Responsible Care, thus allowing participating organizations to gain 
both kinds of certification in a single audit of their EMS. The chemical industry cites that the 
program has been effective in reducing pollution because member companies are required to 
continually improve the management of chemicals. The American Chemistry Council has set up 
public advisory panels to allow for public input and involvement in shaping the initiative. 
Responsible Care has been implemented in more than 45 countries in North America, South 
America, Asia Pacific, Africa, and Europe (CCPA 2004). 
Critics of Responsible Care label it as essentially a public relations effort undertaken by 
the chemical industry to address its negative image in the wake of the deadly 1984 Union 
Carbide gas leak in Bhopal, India.10 To substantiate their claim, the critics argue that during the 
1990s, the Chemical Manufacturers Association spent $1 million to $2 million a year on 
implementing Responsible Care at its member companies, but more than $10 million a year on 
advertisements about the program. Subsequent studies expose the limitations and the 
ineffectiveness of the program (U.S. PIRG 1998, Kleindorfer et al. 2000, Tellus 1996). 
                                                 
10 See Footnote 17. 
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4. Ecolabeling as Certifying Environmental Conduct 
Ecolabeling is a voluntary method of environmental performance certification that caters 
to certain consumers’ preferences. The label signifies that a particular company’s product or 
service has met certain predefined criteria, and as such, ecolabeling is functionally similar to a 
voluntary, standardized, industry-specific environmental COC with certification mechanisms. 
Studying ecolabel programs can offer lessons for considering more rigorous standards for 
environmental conduct in common content for certain industries. It can also offer insights into an 
important driver of the market for environmental content in a COC, because client companies 
seeking to preserve their ecolabel status may demand certain kinds of performance down their 
supply chain. 
Ecolabeling is becoming increasingly popular as a policy because it offers both 
environmental and economic opportunities and highlights better environmental practices. The 
fundamental rationale for ecolabeling is to generate private incentives for improved 
environmental management or better long-term stewardship of natural resources by harnessing 
consumer choice, based on the assumption that credible information will affect consumers’ 
purchases and increase market shares of the certified companies. Companies apply for an 
ecolabel to inform consumers that their products or services meet specific environmental 
standards, enabling them to charge higher prices in these premium markets. Companies may also 
undertake this voluntary to avert (or preempt) more stringent, confrontational, and more costly 
regulation. 
In practice, ecolabeling has several levels, according to the entity or group that defines 
and verifies the compliance criteria: 
•  First-party labeling schemes, also referred to as self-declaration, are established by 
individual companies based on their own product standards. Company-based 
environmental standards in COCs fall in this category. 
•  Second-party labeling schemes are established by industry associations. Compliance 
is verified either through certification procedures within the industry or by external 
certifying companies. 
•  Third-party labeling schemes are usually established by an initiator (public or private) 
that is independent from the producers, distributors, and sellers of the labeled 
products. 
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All of those schemes can have third-party verification; the distinction lies in the 
responsibility for setting the standards. ISO standards combine aspects of first- and third-party 
programs: companies set their standards for performance, informed by minimum ISO 
requirements, and verification is performed independently. Most timber-certification programs 
started as a second-party industry-designed framework in the early 1990s. Currently, all forest 
ecolabel programs are developed and managed by independent organizations that represent 
various stakeholders (see Fischer et al. 2005). 
Because standardized environmental provisions for COCs would fall primarily in the last 
category (like the ISO standards, at least in part), we focus on drawing lessons from the impacts 
and scope of third-party labeling schemes. Within the third-party category are two types of 
labels: the seal of approval and single-attribute certification programs. Seal-of-approval 
programs (e.g., Blue Angel, Green Seal) award or license the use of a logo to products that the 
program judges to be less environmentally harmful than comparable products, based on a 
specific set of criteria. Single-attribute certification programs (e.g. Biodegradable, Recycled) 
certify that claims made for a single attribute of a product meet a specified definition. Such 
programs define specific terms such as recycled and biodegradable and review applications from 
marketers for verification that their product attribute meets the program definition. Alternatively, 
programs can set requirements for manufacturers to meet (e.g., U.S. Energy Star). 
Most of the existing broad-based ecolabeling schemes have evolved along a common 
path. In the early 1990s, ministries of the environment, environmental agencies, and equivalent 
governmental institutions established and promoted the adoption of national ecolabel schemes to 
increase public awareness of products that made less impact on the environment. Agenda 21, an 
outcome of the 1992 Earth Summit, endorsed these kinds of voluntary approaches.11 Chapter 4 of 
that report, Changing Consumption Patterns, explicitly encourages the development of national 
policies and strategies for environmental labeling, product LCA, and information campaigns to 
increase consumer awareness: 
4.20. The recent emergence in many countries of a more environmentally 
conscious consumer public, combined with increased interest on the part of some 
industries in providing environmentally sound consumer products, is a significant 
                                                 
11 Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally, and locally by organizations of the 
United Nations system, governments, and major groups in every area in which humans affect the environment 
(www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm). 
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development that should be encouraged. Governments and international 
organizations, together with the private sector, should develop criteria and 
methodologies for the assessment of environmental impacts and resource 
requirements throughout the full life cycle of products and processes. Results of 
those assessments should be transformed into clear indicators in order to inform 
consumers and decision makers. 
4.21. Governments, in cooperation with industry and other relevant groups, 
should encourage expansion of environmental labeling and other environmentally 
related product information programs designed to assist consumers to make 
informed choices. 
4.22. They should also encourage the emergence of an informed consumer public 
and assist individuals and households to make environmentally informed choices 
by: 
(a) Providing information on the consequences of consumption choices and 
behavior so as to encourage demand for environmentally sound products and use 
of products; 
(b) Making consumers aware of the health and environmental impact of products, 
through such means as consumer legislation and environmental labeling; 
(c) Encouraging specific consumer-oriented programs, such as recycling and 
eposit/refund systems. (UNCED 1992) 
Despite initial government involvement, today, the development of criteria and standards 
for ecolabeling is more often managed by independent third-party organizations (e.g., Canada’s 
Environmental Choice, New Zealand’s Environmental Choice, Taiwan’s Green Mark, and 
Thailand’s Green Label). The current approach moves from purely public management to a 
multiple-stakeholder scheme in an effort to increase private involvement and build credibility 
and transparency. Criteria for ecolabeling have also evolved from a product standard to a more 
complex evaluation of environmental performance. 
With the aim to improve, promote, and develop the ecolabeling of products and services, 
the Global Ecolabelling Network (GEN) was created in 1994 as an association of third-party 
organizations that label environmental performance. Its 26 members share GEN’s objectives and 
meet basic ecolabel criteria.12 GEN has promoted cooperation and mutual recognition between 
different national ecolabeling schemes. 
                                                 
12 For a list of GEN members, visit http://www.gen.gr.jp/members.html. 
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With the proliferation of labels came efforts to standardize aspects of ecolabeling. 
Responding to a need for greater transparency and credibility, given the large variety of and 
variation in certification programs. ISO began to address ecolabeling in the 14020 series. The 
ISO defines environmental performance labeling as a “a voluntary, multiple-criteria based, third-
party program that awards a license that authorizes the use of environmental labels on products 
indicating overall environmental preferability of a product within a particular product category 
based on life cycle considerations” (Global Ecolabelling Network n.d.). ISO 14024 defines the 
principles for how responsible ecolabeling programs should operate while allowing for 
individual program flexibility, criteria, and national or regional environmental values and 
priorities. GEN has adopted this standard for verification, testing, and environmental criteria 
(GEN 1999). 
National Ecolabels in Practice 
Several countries have publicly sponsored the development of multiproduct ecolabels, 
often in partnership with industry or NGOs. Table 9 in the Appendix summarizes some of these 
ecolabeling schemes, organized by country or region. Most ecolabel programs target consumers 
in developed countries, with a few exceptions like India’s Ecomark and Thailand’s Green Label. 
Thus, the incentives in developing countries to adhere to ecolabel standards apply primarily to 
export sectors. However, the increasing emphasis on LCA means that not only producers of 
consumer goods but also suppliers of intermediate goods may face pressures to comply. As such, 
ecolabels in trade partner countries can create opportunities for exporters to tap premium 
markets—or they may create barriers to market access, if it is more difficult for developing 
country producers to meet and certify compliance with those standards.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) studied the 
market, trade, and environmental impacts of selected national ecolabeling programs, including 
the E.U. Eco-label, Nordic Swan, Swedish Environmental Choice, Canadian Environmental 
Choice, Blue Angel, Green Seal, Japanese Eco Mark, and Norme Française Environnement 
(OECD 1997). Although the study cites anecdotal evidence supporting the various hypotheses on 
ecolabeling, the lack of empirical data does not allow statistical verification. The programs 
studied differ in many aspects, but all of their mission statements are consistent with ISO’s draft 
general principles of ecolabels. Accordingly, the two objectives of environmental labels (and 
declarations) are to achieve market-driven, continuous environmental improvement (which will 
occur if labels can increase the demand for and supply of environmentally preferable products 
and services) and to communicate verifiable, accurate, nondeceptive information on the 
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environmental attributes of products and services. The main impacts on markets, trade, and 
environment are distilled in the following paragraphs. 
Market Impacts 
The OECD 1997 study found it difficult to ascertain the market impacts of ecolabeling, 
given the sparse data. However, scattered anecdotal evidence indicates that sales increase when a 
product has been certified with an ecolabel.13 Additionally, producers continue to apply for and 
pay for ecolabeling, indicating that it has some market value. Any impacts on consumer choice 
due to ecolabels assume that consumers trust the certifying institution as an independent body 
with no conflict of interest with the product manufacturers. Countries that have more informed 
consumers experience greater market impacts. Ecolabeling is also demand driven, especially 
where it has been used to identify environmentally preferable products for government 
procurement and institutional purchasing. The OECD report emphasizes that no statistical data 
support the anecdotal information. 
Trade Effects 
The OECD study was unable to gather evidence regarding changes in trade flows arising 
from selected ecolabeling programs. However, labeling schemes that include production-related 
criteria are raising concern because such criteria can discriminate against imports when they 
reflect the environmental conditions and preferences of the importing country exclusively; the 
effects can be particularly acute for developing countries and countries heavily dependent on 
exports. If the product is highly traded and if the ecolabel contains production and process-
related criteria, then the ecolabel may constitute a barrier to competition in the marketplace.  
Environmental Effectiveness 
The economic advantage of an ecolabel to a firm lies in its relative exclusivity. 
Accordingly, the environmental benefit sought through ecolabeling will be achieved when a 
balance is reached between the number of ecolabeled products and the stringency of the criteria. 
Because of the difficulty of distinguishing the environmental benefits of ecolabeled products 
                                                 
13 Anecdotal evidence is also available for developing countries. For example, when Century Textiles of Bombay, 
the largest textile company in India, gained Öko-Tex certification for its products, it was able to raise prices by 8–
10% and increase market access by 10% (Khan et al 2003). The costs of achieving certification were not reported. 
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from benefits achieved via other environmental measures, environmental effectiveness has 
instead been evaluated indirectly on the basis of consumers’ awareness of and demand for 
ecolabeled products and of changes in producers’ behavior. Public awareness and attitudes 
toward ecolabeled products vary significantly. In some countries, ecolabel development has 
affected the behavior of manufacturers, strongly encouraging them to modify their products so 
they can qualify for an ecolabel and maintain their products in retail chains. 
Ecolabel criteria are generally set so that only a small percentage (5–30%) of products in 
a category can obtain the ecolabel. In practice, successful ecolabeled products often cover more 
than 30% of the market share in a product category. If too large a proportion of products is 
ecolabeled, however, the label is no longer an exclusive identifier of environmental compliance 
within that product category, resembling instead a de facto voluntary standard. In that case, price 
premiums are likely to be limited. 
Some Other Studies of Ecolabeling 
Since the OECD 1997 study, ecolabeling has gained increasing attention in economics 
research. Additional empirical analysis has attempted to quantify the strength of this “market” 
effect of ecolabeling. Bjørner et al. (2004) analyzed the effect of the Nordic Swan ecolabel on 
consumer choice and estimated models for consumer choices in Denmark among different 
brands of toilet paper, paper towels, and detergents. Their research indicated that the marginal 
willingness to pay for certified environmentally friendly brands ranges from 13% to 18% of the 
price. The effect was insignificant for paper towels, however, because “green” consumers were 
more likely to use reusable dishcloths instead. The researchers emphasize that Danish consumers 
respond to ecolabels because of their high degree of environmental awareness and their 
confidence in the certifying body (the government); Scandinavians have relatively aggressive 
environmental policies in general. 
A large body of empirical evidence has documented a positive marginal willingness to 
pay extra for environmentally labeled products.14 However, an important question is whether that 
premium is sufficient to generate positive effects on the market equilibrium. For example, in the 
timber sector, Upton and Bass (1996) and Mattoo and Singh (1994) cite evidence that 80% of 
                                                 
14 For example, Henion 1972, Levin 1990, Cairncross 1992, Wasik 1996, Nimon and Beghin 1999, Kirchhoff 2000, 
Bennett et al. 2001, Cason and Gangadharan 2001, Roe et al. 2001, and Teisl et al. 2002. 
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consumers in U.K. and Canadian markets are willing to pay a premium for such products  
as sustainably harvested wood products. However, Sedjo and Swallow (2002) find that the 
market for certified sustainably harvested wood products may not generate a price differential 
between labeled and unlabeled wood to the extent indicated by surveys of consumer demand 
alone. A more recent study by Anderson and Hansen (2004) suggests that price premiums for 
ecolabeled wood products may be possible for special small market segments. We discuss 
additional empirical studies of ecolabeling in the forestry sector in an RFF discussion paper 
(Fischer et al. 2005). 
The analytical economics literature cautions that, from a global perspective, 
implementing an ecolabeling program can lead to ambiguous results on welfare. Mason (2001) 
finds that when third-party certification is an imperfect test of “greenness,” ecolabeling can 
reduce or expand the volume of green production, depending in part on the costs of certification 
and test accuracy. Greaker (2002) looks at the trade and welfare effects of ecolabeling compared 
with environmental standards. With international trade in industrial commodities whose 
processing or production pollutes the local environment, global welfare can in some 
circumstances be higher with an ecolabel scheme than with national regulation. 
Both results have relevance for implementing environmental conduct standards in 
developing countries. On one hand, in a context of limited capacity for national regulation and 
enforcement, certification can improve welfare. On the other hand, developing countries are 
wary of external efforts to set environmental standards. The general perception is that high 
compliance costs make their exports less competitive in international markets and constitute a 
form of protectionism (Najam 2002). Greaker (2002) notes that ecolabels can improve the 
welfare of exporting countries in some circumstances, but not all.  
The benefits of ecolabeling and its effect on trade and developing countries are under 
discussion at the World Trade Organization. Even though ecolabeling is voluntary, developing 
countries fear that the absence of a label could hurt their trade prospects, thus making it a de 
facto standard. For example, forest certification has gained widespread popularity in 
industrialized countries but has achieved relatively little penetration among developing country 
producers, due to the greater relative costs of certification and the lack of domestic consumer 
demand for it. Many developing country stakeholders harbor mistrust of certification, believing 
that rather than encourage improved forest management, it serves as a nontariff barrier to trade 
by discriminating against uncertified providers (see Fischer et al. 2005). 
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Another lesson from the literature is that the accuracy of compliance verification systems 
may be critical to achieving positive results, not only in accessing premium prices but also in 
ensuring that the companies that enjoy expanded market share are that much cleaner than those 
they displace. Furthermore, enthusiasm should be tempered by awareness that the price 
premiums that certification generates are not always sufficient to justify the costs or to generate 
significantly positive environmental outcomes. 
Costs of Ecolabels 
Even though application and annual fees represent only a small percentage of the total 
costs involved in ecolabel certification, it is interesting to highlight the common approach to 
setting those charges. Most programs (i.e., Blue Angel, India’s Ecomark, E.U. Flower, Korean 
Eco Label, and Nordic Swan) set an annual license fee as a percentage of annual turnovers. 
Environmental Choice New Zealand sets its fee based on declared annual net sales rather than 
total turnover. 
For example, E.U. Flower application fees are EUR 300–1,300. In addition, annual fees 
are assessed at 0.15% of annual sales volume of the product within the community, with a 
minimum of EUR 500 up to a maximum of EUR 25,000. For both fee types, a 25% discount is 
available for small and medium-sized enterprises and applicants from developing countries. The 
program also offers a 15% reduction in annual fees for companies already registered under 
EMAS or certified under ISO 14001, perhaps because it is easier for companies with an EMS in 
place to comply with requirements set by an ecolabel program. However, these fees do not cover 
testing and verification costs, which have to be met by the applicant. 
In addition to participation fees and verification costs, firms also incur costs from 
changing their production processes to comply with the standard. To get a sense of the 
comprehensive costs of participating in an ecolabel program, the Korea Environmental Labelling 
Association (2004) issued a report based on an analysis prepared by Do et al (2003). Based on a 
survey of 43 companies in South Korea, Kwak estimates that total costs per product are on 
average 15.5% higher than for similar conventional products that are not certified. These values 
include costs associated with process and design renovation, facility maintenance, management 
of product quality and performance, replaced input materials, product testing for compliance 
verification, and license fees. Table 7 summarizes the findings, which reveal product cost 
increases ranging from 3.3% for printing paper to 51.4% for laundry detergent. 
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Table 7: Additional Costs per Product Awarded the Korean Ecolabel  
Compared with Conventional Products 
Product  Additional Cost of Ecolabel
Printing paper  3.3% 
Fluorescent lamps  4.3% 
Laser printers  8.9% 
Tap water faucets  9.0% 
Toilet paper  15.3% 
Household gas boilers  16.8% 
Laundry detergent  51.4% 
             Source: Kwak 2003. 
Lessons from Ecolabeling 
According to the Consumers Union guide to environmental labels (Eco-labels 2002), a 
good ecolabel should indicate that an independent organization has verified that a product meets 
meaningful and consistent standards for environmental protection. The main challenge to 
policymakers and agencies is to address the concerns of both consumers and producers about 
standards verification and compliance while maximizing benefits. The benefits should include 
customer satisfaction and profits to producers as well as environmental protection. The important 
features of ecolabels learned to date are described in the following sections. 
Meaningful and Verifiable 
Ecolabels should reflect environmentally meaningful standards that can be verified by the 
certifier or another independent inspection organization. The labels should convey some tangible 
information that consumers can understand, rather that being an abstract declaration of 
environmental protection. To avoid potential conflicts of interest, the organization that grants the 
ecolabel should be an independent body. 
Consistent and Clear 
Ecolabels signal the environmental commitment or stringency of producers. Consumers 
can make sound decisions about labeled products only if the signals are clear and consistent. The 
labels should therefore state the environmental goals that the standards are trying to achieve. 
Generic ecolabels that reflect environmental commitments common to all industries, such as 
energy efficiency or recycling and reuse, should be consistent across products. 
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Stakeholders’ Input 
Labels that are developed with input from multiple stakeholders—including consumers, 
firms, and environmental organizations—are more likely to be adopted and accepted as credible 
standards. Including all stakeholders also promotes transparency in the process and 
understanding of what the label signifies. 
Continuous Improvement 
Ecolabels should be revised regularly to ensure that they meet their proposed objectives, 
increase transparency, promote credibility, and improve stakeholder involvement. For example, 
the E.U. ecolabel scheme was created in 1992, was revised in 2000, and will be reviewed again 
before the end of September 2005. The revision process should include stakeholder input from 
industry workers, community members, local firms, MNEs, and governments. 
Information 
As a market mechanism, an ecolabel provides additional environmental information 
about a product that consumers take into account when making purchasing decisions. Providing 
consumers and producers with access to information in clear formats is crucial for the success of 
a label (Teisl et al. 2002). Furthermore, the success of a program hinges on the environmental 
awareness of consumers (Bjørner et al. 2004). At a minimum, consumers must know what the 
label stands for and the environmental goals achieved by compliance. Consumers also must have 
confidence in the authenticity of the label. This can be facilitated if they have access to details of 
certifying authority. Independent not-for-profit organizations like the Consumer Policy Institute 
play a vital role in disseminating information to consumers about ecolabels, the standards met, 
and the authenticity of the certifying bodies. 
Information is equally important to industry. Small firms especially may be unaware of 
existing ecolabels and the procedures for acquiring one. Often the only source of information 
regarding the various ecolabeling schemes is the body in charge of certification and 
implementation of the ecolabel. Although it is not a major issue with large producers and 
manufacturers, smaller firms with limited access to resources are disadvantaged. Industry groups 
and associations can fill this void by providing manufacturers with resources and acting as a 
clearinghouse for information about ecolabeling, procedures for acquiring certification, and 
market studies that would be useful to a potential ecolabeled company. 
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Cost of Compliance to Producers 
Acquiring an ecolabel and complying with standards are resource-intensive undertakings 
for most manufacturers, especially small units that supply larger industries and do not interact 
directly with consumers. The costs of certification form a larger proportion of costs for small 
firms than for large companies. To help small firms, industry associations can provide resources 
and information on certification schemes and best practices to achieve environmental and 
efficiency targets. Improving access to credit and providing loans for certification could also 
make certification feasible for some firms. 
After acquiring certification, firms must undergo periodic inspection, the cost of which is 
borne by the firm. Industry associations could also make group certification a feasible alternative 
for small-scale producers and manufacturers. A certificate could be issued to a group of 
producers managed by a common body that maintains records and supervises each holding; 
certification costs would be shared among several producers. To be successful, however, this 
option requires a functioning organization able to guarantee to the inspector that each individual 
holding complies with the law. 
5. Monitoring and Reporting Programs 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a worldwide trend toward government-mandated 
disclosure of information about firms’ environmental performance (e.g., Tietenberg 1998).15 The 
emergence of these programs reflects a combination of increasing public concern about 
environmental degradation, technological innovations (such as the Internet) that have 
dramatically lowered the costs of information collection and dissemination, and the inability of 
traditional regulatory structures to cope with the sheer numbers of potentially harmful 
substances. The last factor is particularly germane to developing countries, where regulations are 
more likely to be weak and poorly enforced. 
Unlike voluntary standards or ecolabels, reporting programs do not require specific 
achievements in environmental performance; rather, they mandate that participating firms in an 
industry disclose their emissions. Like public declarations of COCs and ecolabeling, reporting 
programs attempt to harness the influence of informed consumers and communities to promote 
                                                 
15 These trends also apply to voluntary information disclosure and to other nonenvironmental indicators of firms’ 
social performance, such as labor standards and human rights (e.g., O’Rourke 2004, Portney 2004).  
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behavioral change in companies. Although voluntary programs use information dissemination as 
a carrot (to attract higher-paying consumers), mandatory reporting programs can use information 
as a stick (to generate negative attention to galvanize stakeholders and encourage preemptive 
emissions reductions). 
In this section, we assess the potential for public disclosure (through reporting programs) 
to play a role in the environmental content of COCs. The reasons for considering such a 
recommendation are threefold and of particular relevance for developing country needs. First, 
information provision is a relatively low-cost requirement, yet these programs seem to have had 
intriguing impacts on environmental performance. Second, information provision enhances the 
transparency, credibility, and verifiability of a COC, thus improving the likelihood of benefits in 
terms of access to premium markets. Third, information provision enhances the abilities of local 
regulators and community activists to ensure compliance with local laws and to better target their 
own monitoring and enforcement resources. 
The discussion of mandatory environmental disclosure programs begins by focusing 
mainly on the poster child for these programs, TRI.16 This U.S. program was the first major 
disclosure law, much has been written about it, and many of the lessons that can be drawn from it 
apply to other information disclosure programs. We also discuss the Indonesian Program for 
Pollution Control, Evaluation, and Rating (PROPER). Finally, we consider the incorporation of 
mandatory reporting into a voluntary COC. 
Background 
The tragic 1984 chemical accident in Bhopal, India, and several smaller-scale toxic leaks 
in the United States heightened concerns about emissions of hazardous materials.17 The U.S. 
                                                 
16 The information in this section is based on several sources, particularly Bouwes et al. 2001, Fung and O’Rourke 
2000, Graham and Miller 2001, and U.S. EPA 2003. 
17 In 1984, methyl isocyanate gas leaked out of a storage tank at a Bhopal Union Carbide pesticide factory and 
drifted over nearby residential areas, killing 2,000 people and injuring another 300,000. Local health and other 
emergency service officials were unaware of the toxicity of chemicals at the factory and did not know how to treat 
victims. In 1985, the same chemical leaked from another Union Carbide plant in Institute, West Virginia, and 
injured more than 100 people. 
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Congress responded by passing the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA) in 1986.18 
The main purpose of EPCRA was to help emergency services in communities throughout 
the nation prepared to deal with heath problems in the event of chemical accidents. To this end, 
the act required that manufacturers in standard industrial classification (SIC) codes 20 through 
39 report the amount and location of chemicals stored at their facilities so that local officials 
would have some idea of the potential consequences of leakages. 
The act also required U.S. EPA and states to collect annual data on the releases of certain 
chemicals from each facility into air, water, and land; facilities had to report the quantity of 
chemicals that they recycled, treated, burned, or otherwise disposed of, both on and off site. The 
TRI created as a result of the act was based on the principle that local residents had a right to 
know about the potential hazards of nearby industrial facilities (U.S. EPA 1995). With this 
information, citizen groups can hold companies accountable for how they manage toxic 
chemicals. Businesses have an incentive to limit chemical releases to avoid being listed among 
the worst polluters, which could seriously damage their reputations and sales. The data also serve 
as a rough indicator of environmental progress over time. 
TRI was innovative in taking a multimedia approach, the logic being that if firms must 
report releases into water but not into air, then they might have a perverse incentive to substitute 
air releases for water releases, thereby giving the false appearance that they are reducing 
pollution.19 
The U.S. EPA administrator has the authority to decide which industries must report 
emissions, what chemicals must be reported, and threshold emissions levels below which 
facilities do not need to report. Since TRI’s inception, the scope of the program has been 
substantially expanded. In 1998, seven sectors were added to the list of those required to disclose 
their emissions: metal and coal mining, coal- and oil-burning electric utilities, commercial 
                                                 
18 Prior to EPCRA, very little regulatory attention had been paid to chemicals, even though it was well understood 
from the health literature that toxic pollution could seriously harm human health. As late as 1986, federal regulations 
had finalized rules for only 26 chemicals of a total of more than 75,000. Full text of the act is available at  
www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title42/chapter116_.html.  
19 The Clean Water Act, whose regulations target releases into water but not air or land, is one example of a 
regulation that may create perverse incentives (Gottleib 1995). 
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hazardous waste-treatment and -disposal facilities, chemical distributors, petroleum terminals, 
solvent-recycling services, and federal facilities (e.g., military bases). 
Moreover, U.S. EPA has issued new rules that have roughly doubled the number of 
chemicals that must be reported to approximately 650. Most of these substances are not 
themselves regulated, but there are many important exceptions, such as the six criteria air 
pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act. Reporting thresholds have been lowered to bring 
smaller-scale facilities into the reporting system. By 2001, more than 20,000 industrial facilities 
reported for the TRI. 
The annual TRI data collected by U.S. EPA are made available to the public through 
various websites; some organizations also post the data on their own websites.20 Anyone can 
thereby find out about emissions from individual facilities anywhere in the country, examine a 
company’s overall environmental record across its various facilities, and track specific chemicals 
of concern. 
Users of TRI Data 
Communities 
Public interest and community groups use TRI data to pressure local facilities to  
reduce toxic releases and minimize the risks of chemical accidents.21 The data also may be  
used to inform the general public about chemical releases and the risk of leakages, to show  
that new regulations are needed, or to suggest that enforcement of existing regulations should  
be tightened. 
Governments 
At the federal, state, and local level, government agencies use TRI data to help set 
priorities and allocate environmental protection resources where they are most needed. 
                                                 
20 See TRI Explorer (http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer); Envirofacts (http://www.epa.gov/enviro); Scorecard 
(http://www.scorecard.org), which was developed by Environmental Defense; and the Right-to-Know Network 
(http://www.rtknet.org), which was developed by Unison Institute. U.S. EPA also publishes summaries of the data 
each year in the Toxics Release Inventory: Public Data Release and the Toxics Release Inventory: Public Data 
Release: State Fact Sheets, and state governments publish their own reports. 
21 Such groups published more than 200 reports between 1989 and 1994 using TRI data (Orum 1994). 
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Regulators use TRI data to set emissions limits for facilities, check whether facilities are 
complying with allowable limits, and assess penalties for noncompliance. Disclosure laws in 
several states expand reporting requirements and, in some cases, mandate emissions reductions.22 
In most states, firms can receive technical assistance from state environmental protection 
agencies to help them reduce chemical releases. 
U.S. EPA uses TRI data to assess health risks from toxic releases, to measure 
environmental progress over time, and to develop and implement new environmental legislation. 
TRI is also used to assess compliance with other environmental regulations (such as emissions 
reductions mandated by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments); to target areas where the 
enforcement of other regulations is needed; to gauge the need for additional regulatory efforts to 
clean up water, air, and solid waste problems; and to develop strategies for assessing pollution 
prevention problems. 
Businesses and Financial Markets 
Businesses use TRI data to help judge the need and opportunities for emissions reduction 
measures and to demonstrate improved environmental performance over time. Investment 
analysts use TRI data to identify companies that have good environmental records and thus could 
be socially responsible investment opportunities. Insurance companies use TRI data to help 
predict the risk of individual companies’ being subject to lawsuits or regulatory penalties. 
Labor Unions 
Labor leaders have used TRI data to argue for improved working conditions, including 
lower exposure to chemicals and better safety equipment. 
Academic Researchers 
Researchers have used TRI data in studies of the effects of toxic chemicals (on human 
health and other areas) and in the development of technologies to lower the risk of toxic releases 
and to improve recycling. 
                                                 
22 For example, in 1989, Louisiana passed a new law requiring a 50% cut in air emissions of certain toxics by 1994. 
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Effects of TRI on Pollution Reduction 
At first, many environmental groups were skeptical about the significance of the new 
disclosure requirements of EPCRA, believing that simply requiring firms to provide information 
about environmental performance was no substitute for mandated improvements in performance. 
However, since EPCRA was enacted, releases of TRI-listed chemicals have fallen dramatically, 
even though the U.S. economy as a whole expanded rapidly during the 1990s. According to TRI 
reports, toxic releases fell by 46% from 1988 to 1999; the percentage reduction tended to be 
greater for the most toxic chemicals (Graham and Miller 2001). During the same period, the 
emissions of several pollutants subject to mandatory controls under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments—including carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates, and volatile organic 
compounds, which are not on the TRI list—showed little if any downward trend (Fung and 
O’Rourke 2000). Because TRI data collection costs U.S. EPA only about $23 million per year, it 
is not surprising that policymakers and others have concluded that TRI is one of the most 
successful national environmental programs.23 
The figures on the effectiveness of TRI in the preceding paragraph, however, may give an 
overly optimistic impression about the effectiveness of information disclosure programs in 
encouraging emissions reductions (e.g., Natan and Miller 1998). First, the rate of emissions 
decline diminished after the first several years of the program. From 1988 to 1993, total releases 
decreased 37%, with reductions averaging 7% a year; from 1993 to 1998, emissions dropped 
20% (Graham and Miller 2001). This finding suggests that in the first few years, firms achieved 
low-cost emissions reductions by substituting other raw materials for toxic chemicals, enhancing 
recycling and waste treatment, and reformulating products. Additional emissions reductions are 
more costly; hence, we expect the pace of emissions reductions would slow over time. 
Second, some of the reduction in TRI-listed chemicals might be due to their replacement 
with other chemicals—possibly also toxic but unlisted. Data are not readily available on the 
extent to which the use of unlisted chemicals may have increased as firms attempted to lower 
their TRI releases. 
                                                 
23 In 1996, then EPA Administrator Carol Browner declared that TRI “is quite simply one of the most effective 
means we have in this country for protecting the health of our people, the health of our environment.” In 2001, EPA 
Administrator Christine Todd Whitman argued that “this inventory is a powerful tool for helping to protect public 
health and the environment. We’re seeing constant decreases of emissions to air, land, and water.” And Millard 
Etling, Dow Chemical’s environment manager, has asserted that the TRI’s “mandatory disclosure has done more 
than all other legislation put together in getting companies to voluntarily reduce emissions” (Seabrook 1991). 
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Third, many of the TRI-listed chemicals are subject to mandatory reductions through 
other regulatory programs. Therefore, to some extent, observed reductions in TRI chemicals may 
overstate the degree to which they fell because of information disclosure requirements. For 
example, toxic air releases have fallen more than toxic releases to other media since the TRI was 
introduced; however, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments required firms to impose controls on 
toxic air emissions. The underlying contribution of different environmental programs to the 
observed reduction in toxic releases over the past 18 years remains an open research question. 
Fourth, from an environmental perspective, the preferred way to reduce emissions would 
be to reduce the amount of chemical inputs into the production process. If instead firms reduce 
emissions by recycling or end-of-pipe treatment (which includes incineration and landfill 
disposal), then the risks of exposure to workers, chemical accidents, and leakage during 
treatment remain. During the 1990s, less than one-quarter of manufacturing facilities reported 
reducing their waste emissions by reducing chemical inputs; most of the reductions occurred 
through recycling and waste treatment, which increased by 12% and 24%, respectively. In fact, 
only 10% of toxic waste is released; 43% of it is recycled and another 32% is treated (Graham 
and Miller 2001). 
Finally, it is possible that firms have either intentionally or unintentionally underreported 
their emissions, given the incentives to avoid appearing on worst polluter lists and the wide range 
of allowable techniques for estimating emissions. 
Nonetheless, it is still likely that the information disclosure required by TRI has 
contributed to a substantial reduction in toxic releases, and thus TRI has become the poster child 
for a new trend: the use of information disclosure instead of traditional pollution control 
mandates to spur environmental improvements. We now discuss the mechanisms by which 
emissions reductions may come about. 
How Information Disclosure Achieves Toxics Reduction24 
One effect of information disclosure rules is that as citizens become aware of toxic 
releases from facilities close to their neighborhoods, they become more active and organized 
and, perhaps in conjunction with environmental advocacy groups, pressure firms to cut back 
their pollution (e.g., MacLean and Orum 1992). Unlike traditional command-and-control 
                                                 
24 Much of this section is based on Fung and O’Rourke 2000. 
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regulatory approaches, TRI brings local citizens’ groups directly into the determination of the 
socially acceptable level of pollution. Plenty of anecdotal evidence indicates that information 
disclosure has galvanized citizens (e.g., Lynn et al. 1992, MacLean 1993, U.S. EPA 1998a). In a 
survey of about 200 corporate counsels, more than half indicated that “pressure from community 
activists has affected [their] company’s conduct⎯sometimes forcing a reduction in pollution” 
(Lavelle 1993). Still, such campaigns do not explain everything; many firms that were not 
targeted by citizens’ groups have cut back their emissions. 
Another possibility is that the information a firm gathers may help it voluntarily cut back 
on emissions. Perhaps a comparison with the emissions of competitors reveals opportunities for 
improving efficiency and cutting waste that reduce both emissions and operating costs at the 
same time. A firm may wish to improve its environmental performance because it wants to be 
socially responsible. In fact, executives of some large companies promised huge voluntary cuts 
in toxic pollution.25 TRI data may also facilitate efforts by large groups of firms, rather than 
individual firms, to voluntarily reduce pollution; for example, it enabled U.S. EPA to introduce 
the 33/50 Program, which invited companies to reduce emissions of 17 high-priority, TRI-listed 
chemicals 33% by 1992 and 50% by 1995. 
However, there may not be many unexploited opportunities for win–win emissions 
reductions, given existing pressure in a competitive marketplace for firms to find cost-cutting 
measures. Another limitation to the mechanism is that firms put themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage if they engage in costly measures to control pollution but their rivals do not. And 
corporations’ socially responsible behavior may be motivated more by a desire to avoid 
environmental blacklisting than by altruism. In fact, certain industries have tried to prevent the 
introduction and expansion of information disclosure, presumably because they feared it might 
lead to mandatory emissions controls.26 
Perhaps the most important reason why firms have reduced emissions in response to 
information disclosure is fear of environmental blacklisting (Fung and O’Rourke 2000, Graham 
                                                 
25 A notable example occurred just before the first TRI reporting deadline in 1988, when Richard J. Mahoney, then 
head of Monsanto, declared that he had been shocked that Monsanto was releasing 374 million pounds of toxic 
substances each year. He pledged to cut air emissions from his company’s 35 plants by 90% over the next four 
years. Other well-known companies, such as 3M, AT&T, Dow Chemical, DuPont, and Merck, also pledged to 
voluntarily reduce toxic emissions (Cushman 1995). 
26 For example, in 1994, the Chemical Manufacturers’ Association sued U.S. EPA when the agency expanded the 
number of chemicals listed in TRI (Fairley 1997). 
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2000). That is, they fear the harm to their reputations if environmental groups, journalists, or 
others list them among worst environmental offenders in the community, state, or nation on the 
basis of TRI data. The pressure to reduce emissions is ongoing because the rankings are relative: 
blacklists show which firms have the highest emissions relative to other companies that year, 
rather than a company’s current emissions compared with its own past emissions. 
If a firm gains a reputation as a notorious polluter, it can suffer financial harm. 
Consumers may boycott its products and buy from rival companies. The firm may have difficulty 
attracting workers without paying a premium for the health risks associated with working at a 
dirty plant or for the distaste that altruistic employees suffer from working for a blacklisted 
company. And investors with a preference for socially minded companies may be unwilling to 
buy stock in a blacklisted company unless they receive a higher return on their investments than 
for comparable (environmentally responsible) firms. The ability of investors to make these 
choices has been facilitated by the rise of mutual funds whose managers use environmental 
criteria to screen their holdings (e.g., Portney forthcoming). Recent research appears to confirm 
that bad publicity from environmental blacklisting has a negative effect on firms’ stock prices 
and that those firms subsequently reduce their toxic emissions (e.g., Hamilton 1995, Konar and 
Cohen 1997, LaPlante and Lanoie 1994).27 
Moreover, a company singled out for its poor environmental record might suffer greater 
likelihood of future regulation or enforcement of existing regulation (e.g., Maxwell and Decker 
1998, Maxwell et al. 1998). Also, Decker (1999) finds that firms with lower rates of TRI releases 
are subject to less frequent inspections by regulatory agencies. 
Limits of TRI Data 
Although TRI is the most comprehensive national source of information on toxic 
chemical emissions, it is limited in important respects. 
TRI does not cover all toxic chemicals. The approximately 650 chemicals that firms 
have to report represent less than 1% of the more than 75,000 chemicals manufactured in the 
                                                 
27 A careful reading of the literature on corporate social responsibility more broadly from those in the corporate 
world makes it clear that they engage in beyond-compliance behavior because they feel that most or all of these 
actions pay off economically. Most of the 67 case studies in Holliday et al. 2002 on corporate engagement in 
socially responsible initiatives make reference to—or provide estimates of—the monetary payoff from those 
initiatives in terms of increased consumer demand or prices for labor and capital inputs. 
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United States. Approximately 6 trillion pounds of chemicals are produced each year in the 
United States, but only 7.3 billion pounds of toxic releases were reported in the 1999 TRI. The 
chemicals that are on the TRI list are those thought to have potentially harmful effects on human 
health or the environment, but how many of the unlisted chemicals are actually toxic is unknown 
because U.S. EPA has never systematically reviewed the environmental health data for the other 
99% of chemicals, given that they are so numerous. 
The failure to address all potential chemicals of concern leaves open the possibility that 
firms might reduce their TRI emissions while increasing other emissions, possibly toxic. In this 
regard, observed reductions in TRI emissions over time may overstate—to some unknown 
degree—actual reductions of all toxic emissions. 
Many major sources of toxic emissions do not have to file reports. Even for chemicals 
that are listed, many sources are not subject to disclosure requirements, including motor vehicles, 
dry cleaners, auto repair shops, sewage treatment plants, hospitals, and airports. Also not covered 
are on-farm pesticide use and releases from contaminated sites like landfills or abandoned 
industrial facilities (e.g., Superfund or brownfield sites). According to U.S. EPA (1998b), 41% of 
toxic air emissions come from mobile sources (e.g., cars, trucks, and buses) and another 35% 
from other sources not subject to disclosure; manufacturers subject to disclosure laws account for 
only 24% of such emissions. 
Moreover, the covered industries include significant numbers of small business that are 
exempt from reporting. Facilities that produce fewer than 25,000 pounds of TRI chemicals, use 
fewer than 10,000 pounds of TRI chemicals, or manufacture products that contain less than 1.0% 
concentrations of listed chemicals are exempt from reporting requirements.28 Facilities with 
fewer than 10 full-time workers are also exempt. 
Risk factors (number of people exposed and chemical toxicity) are not reported. TRI 
provides only the total pounds of chemicals released; what matters for health risks is the degree 
of chemical toxicity and the number of people potentially exposed to chemical releases. TRI 
chemicals vary enormously in toxicity. A single pound of a highly toxic chemical (e.g., acrolein 
or methyl isocyanate) is toxicologically equivalent to 100 million pounds of the least toxic of the 
reported substances (Bouwes et al. 2001). 
                                                 
28 However, U.S. EPA has recently lowered reporting thresholds to 10 pounds for a dozen persistent 
bioaccumulative compounds and to 100 pounds for lead, lead compounds, and five other chemicals. 
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Potential exposure to toxic emissions depends on how many people live near chemical 
manufacturing plants or waste processing and disposal facilities, how many workers are 
employed by industries that manufacture and dispose of hazardous chemicals, and how many 
people buy products manufactured from toxic chemicals. The following example illustrates the 
importance of population exposure. In 1997, Utah was rated fifth among states for total pounds 
of TRI chemical releases, but its ranking fell to 37 when releases were weighted by population 
exposure (Bouwes et al. 2001). 
Additional issues complicate the link between emissions and human health risks. The 
higher a facility’s smokestack, the more dispersed its emissions in the atmosphere and the 
smaller the dose received by the local population; local wind patterns, stream flows, and the 
decay rate of chemicals also affect the dosage. Human health effects of certain TRI chemicals 
may also depend on the exposure pathway; for example, friable asbestos is a very potent 
carcinogen if inhaled but not if consumed through food. Because TRI does not consider risk 
factors, companies that want to avoid being blacklisted may undertake expensive investments for 
very little benefit to society; they may not necessarily reduce toxic emissions in areas with 
highest population exposure, focus on the most toxic chemicals, or otherwise measurably reduce 
risk to humans. 
Most academic studies that have used TRI data have not attempted to weight emissions 
by toxicity or potential exposure (e.g., Brajer and Hall 1992, Perlin et al. 1995, Arora and Cason 
1999). One exception is U.S. EPA’s Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model, 
which attempts to assess risk factors for emissions, accounting for the complications just 
described. The model has been used to estimate facility-specific cancer risks. Academic and 
advocacy groups have also used the model to assess exposure to emissions by race and income 
groups (e.g., Bouwes et al. 2001).29 Nonetheless, existing TRI information can be very difficult 
to process for individuals who want to find out risks of living near a chemical factory or a coal-
fired power plant. 
Toxic chemicals used during manufacture or left in products are not reported.  
If reporting requirements were extended beyond releases to include the amount of chemicals 
                                                 
29 The model divides the country into cells of 1 km
2, and each facility is assigned to a specific cell. Census data are 
used to assign a population figure to each cell. The model applies toxicity weights to emissions, where weights are 
assigned separately according to the emissions pathway and for cancer and noncancer risks. Wind patterns and 
stream flows are also considered in assessing dosage. 
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used during the production process and retained in finished products, then workers and 
consumers could better assess the risks to themselves.30 This information might also aid firms in 
finding opportunities for emissions reductions before and during the production process; with 
information on end-of-pipe releases only, firms may concentrate only on postproduction cleanup. 
Accuracy, verification, compliance, and timeliness are problems. Under existing laws, 
facilities are allowed to use a range of techniques for estimating emissions; they do not always 
install precise metering technology, even if it is available. U.S. EPA has very limited resources 
for checking the reliability of emissions reports and only inspects around 3% of facilities each 
year (O’Rourke 2004). These factors reduce the accuracy of the data reported and distort 
comparisons across facilities (because of different estimating techniques) and across time (if 
techniques change over time). In addition, a substantial portion of facilities fail to report 
emissions data (Wolf 1996). Finally, information about releases is posted more than a year after 
the releases actually occurred, a delay that limits the usefulness of reporting. 
Other Environmental Disclosure Programs 
TRI is the best-known example of what is referred to more generally as a pollutant 
release and transfer registry (PRTR).31 A PRTR is any publicly available database of toxic 
chemical releases to air, water, and land, as well as wastes for off-site treatment and disposal, 
obtained from periodic reports collected from factories, power plants, and other stationary 
emissions sources. (Some PRTRs also include estimates of emissions from other sources, such as 
mobile sources and agriculture.) Several countries other than the United States have PRTRs: the 
United Kingdom has the Chemical Release Inventory, Canada created a National Pollutant 
Release Inventory in 1993, and Australia has the National Pollutant Inventory.32 A recent 
directive for the European Union, the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive, 
requires firms in member states to report release data to the European Commission. The users, 
advantages, and limitations that we have described above for the U.S. TRI apply broadly to 
PRTRs in other countries. 
                                                 
30 Some states, such as Massachusetts and New Jersey, have mandated the reporting of chemical use. 
31 For more information, visit the World Bank Group website, http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/prtr.htm. 
32 For countries or regions without environmental data, an industrial pollution projection system has been 
developed, based on the TRI data; it estimates industrial toxic emissions based on the value of output. 
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The momentum for the spread of PRTRs outside the United States followed the 1992 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Chapter 19 of Agenda 21, the charter for sustainable 
development, called on governments to implement and improve national chemical release 
inventories, particularly for releases with risks to human health and the environment, that would 
be available to the general public and international bodies (UNCED 1992, 19.40). OECD has 
since developed guidelines for establishing PRTRs. Also, the parties to the Aarhus Convention 
signed the Kiev Protocol in 2003 that recommended that national PRTRs be mandatory, with 
annual reporting of air, water, and land emissions. 
Indonesia’s PROPER. Facing an expanding industrial sector and severe constraints on 
regulating its environmental impacts, in 1995 Indonesia introduced an information disclosure 
system known as PROPER to create “incentives for compliance through honor and shame” 
(Afsah and Ratunanda 1999). The program is administered by the Environmental Impact and 
Management Agency and initially applied only to water pollutants but is being expanded to 
cover air pollutants and hazardous wastes. Each firm is ranked by color: black for those that 
make no attempt to limit harmful releases, red for those that make some attempt at emissions 
control but less than required to satisfy local emissions standards, blue for those in compliance, 
green for those that overcomply, and gold for those that rank among the cleanest in the world. 
Participating firms file monthly emissions reports and are subject to occasional audits by 
environmental agencies, particularly if reporting looks suspicious. Results from the reporting 
system are made public at a press conference and posted on the Internet. 
In the early years of the program, PROPER appeared to motivate significant 
environmental improvements at those facilities that were initially out of compliance, and some 
recent empirical evidence seems to support this notion (Garcia Lopez et al. 2004). Interestingly, 
based on a survey sent to plant managers in 1998, Afsah et al. (2000) find that the main stated 
motivation for reduced chemical releases was the potential opportunity for emissions savings; 
however, we note that because most of the improvements brought companies toward compliance 
with existing regulations, fear of enforcement is a more likely motivator.33 This evidence 
contrasts somewhat with the U.S. studies discussed earlier, which suggest that the threat of 
environmental blacklisting is the most decisive factor in reducing emissions; however, the U.S. 
firms were largely in compliance with prevailing regulations. 
                                                 
33 In June 1995, 115 facilities had red ratings and six had black ratings; by September 1996, 87 facilities had red 
ratings and only one a black rating. 
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Based on the Indonesian model, the Philippines has introduced a similar emissions 
disclosure and ranking program, called EcoWatch. Other programs have been or soon will be 
implemented in some other developing countries, including China, Mexico, India, Colombia, 
Bangladesh, Mexico, Czech Republic, and Thailand. The availability of emissions registries and 
public information programs in many developing countries creates an opportunity to more easily 
incorporate information disclosure into common environmental content and leverage the benefits 
of a COC to expand participation in these programs. 
6. Toward Feasible, Common Environmental Content in COCs 
When the goal is to improve economic and environmental well being in developing 
countries, any recommendations for common environmental content for corporate COCs should 
be expected to produce meaningful results on both fronts. First, adherence to the code provisions 
should offer economic benefits that exceed the costs of compliance to companies in developing 
countries; in other words, companies must receive a price premium, market expansion, efficiency 
gains, subsidized technical assistance, or some combination of these benefits in exchange for 
meeting the requirements. Second, adherence should produce significant improvements in 
environmental outcomes; that is, the code must impose real requirements, and monitoring and 
enforcement must offer sufficient incentives to prevent evasion. 
With these goals in mind, we offer some guiding principles for establishing common 
environmental content in voluntary COCs. We also raise some key questions that must be 
answered before designing such content: 
•  What is the desired scope or application for the COC—a specific industry or subset in 
a particular country, or any company that wants to promote some degree of 
environmental performance? The scope has important effects on the set of feasible 
and desirable requirements. 
•  Are some goals more important than others? It may be difficult or impossible for a 
simple set of common environmental practices or standards to satisfy all economic, 
environmental, and institutional goals simultaneously. 
•  Which industries are most likely to benefit, and how should the response inform the 
proposed scope and content? 
•  What partners are available to implement such a program? 
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Choosing a Feasible Scope 
The first question to be addressed is whether common environmental content is feasible 
and desirable, and to what extent. The larger the scope, the more oriented environmental content 
must be toward general process rather than performance outcomes; the smaller the scope and the 
more similar the target companies, the more specific the requirements could be. 
With a broad scope, the lessons from the range of existing corporate COCs suggest two 
common requirements: compliance with prevailing laws and regulations and implementation of 
an EMS. Although these fundamental requirements are general, their implementation involves 
addressing the main environmental issues of concern to the firm within the context of its industry 
and host country. To these broad requirements, we add two more: third-party certification and 
information disclosure. These additional recommendations are offered to help further the stated 
goals by improving credibility and transparency, to enhance the market value of the COC, to 
create more meaningful incentives, and to provide useful information to local communities and 
regulators. Together, these four pillars are mutually reinforcing, because each fulfilled 
requirement eases the burden or increases the value of complying with the others. 
In addition to the broad requirements, narrowing the scope by designing some 
environmental content that is specific to an industry or to a host country offers several 
advantages. For example, more precise performance measures can be incorporated that are more 
likely to ensure better environmental outcomes, and requirements can be tailored to key 
environmental concerns and demand for environmental performance, which vary by industry. 
Common environmental content for an industry COC offers the opportunity to both customize 
and advertise requirements in order to obtain the greatest possible market benefits. This lesson is 
apparent from the experiences of national ecolabels and industry-based certification schemes: 
clear and relevant content is essential for tapping consumers willing to pay a premium. 
Most industries have an association that acts as a clearinghouse of information to its 
members, firms within the industry. These trade associations are a resource for disseminating 
good practices and for mobilizing an informational campaign to educate the users of the product 
and the public about the need for and benefits of the COC. For industries that already have 
advanced guidelines for environmental practices in developed countries, these associations offer 
a template for considering relevant content for COC in developing countries. However, where 
industry coordination is lacking, narrowing the scope and increasing the variety of environmental 
content can weaken consumer understanding of the COC. Consequently, the tradeoffs between 
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the benefits of streamlining environmental content for transparency and those of tailoring content 
to better target consumer and environmental needs can depend on industry conditions. 
Common Content across Industries 
Corporate COCs include a wide range of statements about encouraging environmentally 
friendly behavior. However, many such examples of environmental content are too idiosyncratic, 
too vague, too optional, or too unverifiable to contribute to meaningful common content. While 
supportive statements like “encourage recycling” would not likely detract from a COC, and 
many could be gleaned for inclusion in common content, we do not compile them here. We focus 
instead on the kinds of provisions that seem most promising for offering credible environmental 
improvements and tangible market benefits. 
Compliance with Prevailing Laws and Regulations 
Lawful behavior represents a minimum requirement for socially responsible conduct. It is 
also required for certifying an EMS under ISO 14001 guidelines. However, in many developing 
countries, lack of enforcement capacity means that compliance is not necessarily part of business 
as usual, so a meaningful COC has the opportunity to improve performance. Limited regulatory 
capacity also poses a challenge for COC credibility, because the presence of operating permits 
and lack of disciplinary action does not necessarily constitute evidence of compliance. 
Consequently, third-party verification and information disclosure are recommended, to improve 
both the incentives for compliance and the credibility—and thereby the value—of the COC. 
Environmental Management System 
EMS implementation is the most common component of existing corporate COCs. It is 
also a prerequisite for participating in more stringent ecolabel and environmental certification 
programs. 
EMS is a flexible requirement, because it mandates the existence of a management 
process for dealing with environmental aspects of the particular business without requiring 
specific outcomes. The practices related to environmental management are also related to those 
that provide a safe and healthy working environment. For these reasons, an EMS is common 
practice in many diverse industries. The World Bank Group/International Finance Corporation 
(WBG/IFC) also brings to the table considerable experience with and capacity for promoting 
EMSs. The IFC handbook (IFC 2004) touts EMSs such as ISO 14001 as mechanisms for 
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achieving efficiency gains, improving environmental performance, and promoting trade 
prospects. 
The evidence (though somewhat limited) indicates that, on balance, EMS introduction 
leads to significant reported improvements in environmental performance (UNC 2003). Many 
firms have also reported considerable savings in terms of reduced input use; however, these 
savings do not always outweigh the costs of EMS implementation, which can involve 
considerable training and outside consultants. As a consequence, reasonable additional benefits 
such as better market access may also need to be available, or cost sharing and low-interest loans 
may be needed to encourage adoption. 
The expanding use of ISO standards makes them a natural platform for EMS and 
verification guidelines. ISO 14001 standards for an EMS offer widely known and accepted 
practices, which also include a mandate for complying with any applicable environmental 
regulations and laws, the first pillar for environmental content in a COC. The flexibility in ISO 
14001 standards represents both a benefit and a flaw, as the performance goals are company-
specific and relevant, but they need not be overly ambitious or burdensome—or meaningful. 
Still, these issues remain with any EMS program. ISO 14001 guidelines do require public 
disclosure of certain information and a commitment to continuous improvement. Perhaps the 
greatest advantage of the ISO 14001 standards is that they are accompanied by guidelines for 
enforcement and a network of well-respected independent certifying bodies. 
Third-Party Verification 
Some sort of monitoring mechanism is necessary to create real incentives for adherence 
and generate confidence in the COC. Although currently many MNEs rely on internal 
monitoring (if anything at all), demands for credibility seem to be increasing, and confidence in 
smaller companies and those located in developing countries is arguably lower. Third-party 
verification thus offers the greatest credibility. To this end, standard content is beneficial, 
because it allows for the emergence of a larger pool of independent verifiers, operating with 
common standards of their own. 
ISO 14001 certification is a good example. With standardized guidelines, a large network 
of independent certifying bodies has emerged to register compliance. ISO 14001 certification is 
expanding rapidly in the developed world and also in the developing world, particularly in 
China. This indirect evidence of the value of ISO 14001 certification, particularly for exporting 
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firms, is beginning to be validated empirically. Early evidence in Japan indicates that ISO 14001 
certification boosts stock values (Hibiki et al. 2003). 
That said, ISO 14001 certification in itself does not seem to imply better environmental 
performance than ordinary EMS implementation. Certification also entails significant up-front 
costs to the firm, in addition to those related to EMS implementation; the value to the firm of 
increased credibility must outweigh these costs. The value to society of certification also lies in 
this credibility, which opens access to additional market benefits and encourages more firms to 
deploy meaningful EMSs. In other words, although ISO 14001 certification does not necessarily 
make a given EMS and its outcomes better, the fact that investors and consumers value the signal 
means that adopting and certifying an EMS can be more worthwhile than not having an EMS at 
all. In that sense, it reinforces the other environmental content and promotes better performance. 
Taking an alternate path to EMS certification by ISO standards means either finding or 
creating an independent certification authority—or forgoing a good deal of credibility of the 
CSR program. If more particular environmental performance metrics are desired, that content 
could be designed with a specific industry or ecolabel group program in mind to take advantage 
of another existing third-party verification system. Creating a new certifying authority requires 
coordination and buy-in with local governments, NGOs, and industry groups, as appropriate. For 
a network of independent certifiers to evolve, a standard must be not only common but also 
sufficiently commonplace. 
A final alternative might be to make the major multinational clients responsible for 
policing their own supply chain, but few currently find it in their own interest to do so. 
Furthermore, this alternative ignores the returns to scale for having common environmental 
conduct requirements for supply relationships that more resemble a web than a single chain. 
These scale returns represent another kind of trade-off between clarity and specificity, because 
less common environmental content makes it more challenging to organize third-party 
verification mechanisms. 
Information Disclosure 
Given the apparent success of mandatory reporting programs in improving environmental 
performance at relatively low cost, we highlight information disclosure as an option to form part 
of common environmental content in a COC. The benefits of reporting are manifold. First, 
publicly available environmental information is what drives the environmental benefits from 
harnessing community pressure and attracting the attention of corporate managers. Second, 
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information disclosure can help host country governments measure compliance and assess the 
performance of environmental regulations. Finally, reporting enhances the transparency and 
credibility of the COC and its certification system, improving the likelihood of benefits in terms 
of access to premium markets. 
We recognize that the significance of the impact of TRI and other PRTR programs may 
also lie in the fact that participation is mandatory for the key players. Although COC adoption 
itself is voluntary, if disclosure were a standard component, then the benefits of the COC could 
be leveraged to improve the quality and quantity of environmental information that firms 
provide. For the firms that adopt the COC, local regulators and community activists also would 
have better access to information that could not only help them monitor compliance with local 
laws but also enable them to better target their own monitoring and enforcement resources. 
Reduced enforcement actions also offer a benefit to firms, lowering their costs of interacting 
with regulators and dealing with communities. 
Because information needs may vary by country, common disclosure requirements may 
need to be tailored according to the country of operation, in consultation with local stakeholders. 
Reporting should be required for air, water, and land emissions—not only for chemicals listed in 
the TRI, but also for pollutants that are subject to regulation in the host country. In addition to 
toxic chemicals, several other pollutants contribute to environmental and human health damage. 
For example, nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and other fine-particulate air 
pollutants contribute to ozone, limited visibility, ecological harm from acid deposition, and 
serious respiratory and other health consequences. Many of these emissions are covered by 
mandatory regulations in developing countries as they are in the United States; however, better 
information could help control these pollutants as well. 
For example, even well-enforced operating permits and regulatory standards in 
developing countries tend to be based on emissions rates or ambient concentrations, measured 
sporadically. For pollutants that linger and accumulate in the environment, mass emissions are 
more important than emissions concentrations. Information about mass emissions could provide 
better indicators and draw more attention to emissions behavior—such information is also a 
necessary precursor to implementing modern, market-based policies to reduce emissions. 
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As with the TRI, firms may need some flexibility in how they estimate their emissions. 
While sophisticated monitoring devices may be prohibitively costly,34 emissions factor 
methodology based on input use and production technologies can offer reasonable estimates.35 
More importantly, credible environmental standards require that data-reporting requirements be 
explicit and standardized. For this information to have an impact, some institution must receive it 
and make it public. For countries without an existing PRTR, regulators—or third-party verifiers, 
environmental NGOs, or even the multinational companies that stand to benefit—would need to 
develop and implement an information registry. Credibility would be further enhanced by a more 
comprehensive emissions-tracking system that would collect, verify, and maintain data about 
firms’ fuel and chemical purchases, production, and mass emissions. Overall, the development 
and effective operation of such a system could help improve the quality of information available 
to both multinational clients and local regulators. 
As with any enforcement system, random and targeted audits would be needed to 
encourage compliance and to learn about firms’ compliance costs, techniques, and evasive 
actions. The full costs of participating in an emissions registry are not likely to be trivial, because 
they include the costs of enforcement, training in methodology, maintaining and checking the 
database, and monitoring. Especially where the public benefits from information disclosure and 
its incentive effects outweigh the private benefits to adhering to a common COC, a large part of 
the costs may need to be borne by a third party—most likely the host government, perhaps with 
assistance from international donors and NGOs. 
Industry-Specific Environmental Content 
When the scope of environmental content is narrowed to a particular industry, the 
requirements can be more specific than the four general requirements presented earlier. They 
could incorporate more specific behaviors and focus to a greater extent on performance 
                                                 
34 For example, when properly maintained, continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS) are the most accurate 
means of calculating the emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2), NOx, and particulate matter, but the capital and annual 
operating costs of a CEMS can run from $20,000 to $100,000. Sample estimates are from pollution control officers 
at two power plants in metropolitan Manila, Phillippines (Krupnick et al. 2003). 
35 U.S. EPA has developed procedures for preparing emissions factor documents 
(http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/efdocs/procedur.pdf). Because these procedures may be overly complex for 
developing countries, opportunities for streamlining the guidelines—especially for smaller sources—should be 
assessed.  
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outcomes over process, using metrics that have particular relevance to that industry. As such, 
potential content would have to be evaluated by industry. 
Experience with ecolabels, which are similar to a common voluntary COC, offers some 
important lessons. Common standards must be set and mechanisms for verification defined. With 
ecolabels, though, the standards tend to be quite high to represent a selective share of the 
particular product market. 
In contemplating somewhat more specific and rigorous performance standards for 
common environmental content in an industry, it is important to assess whether the proposed 
COC could contribute to, piggyback on, or detract from well-established ecolabeling or other 
certification schemes. We discuss this issue in our case study for timber products (Fischer et al. 
2005); several major certification programs exist, but little penetration has been made into 
developing countries. On one hand, a less costly certification format may be useful if it can 
credibly encourage sustainable practices, particularly if it can allow greater market access. On 
the other hand, an alternative format may not enjoy the same consumer acceptance and offer the 
same benefits as established certification schemes. 
Like ecolabels, if COCs are to reap any market benefits, the code must be understood and 
credible to customers. Meeting these information and advertising requirements is likely to be 
more difficult for COCs—even common ones—because individual companies must market their 
own codes and adherence, typically without the aid of a nationally promoted label. 
Consequently, benefits may be more limited for a COC than for an ecolabel, and those benefits 
may be highly dependent on the level of customer awareness. One exception (and opportunity) 
may be when the customer is a highly engaged multinational corporation with its own brand to 
protect, or when a sufficiently large group of conforming companies (such as an export sector in 
a country) can jointly promote their COCs. On the other hand, Jenkins (2001) expresses concern 
that some of the gains to firms embracing the COC is likely to come off the backs of other 
developing country businesses, as corporate buyers narrow their supply chain to those that can 
certify their compliance with the code. 
If the benefits are indeed limited, not much voluntary adherence can be expected unless 
the compliance costs are also quite low. It implies little behavioral change relative to business as 
usual—unless those changes involve sufficient efficiency gains as well as environmental 
improvements, which runs counter to more rigorous standards. Furthermore, the costs of 
verification must also be low so as not to exceed the benefits, which is challenged by the smaller 
scale over which certification bodies must meet their costs. 
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Life-Cycle Assessment 
LCA represents an additional step (and likely the next wave) toward stronger content that 
retains common principles. ISO standards also govern the implementation and verification of 
LCA, just like EMSs, so many of those same advantages apply. LCA could be a means of 
elevating a company’s products to be eligible for many national ecolabels. As such, it is likely to 
be a more costly process, and absent the benefits of an explicit ecolabel, the gains are likely to be 
smaller.36 However, in some situations, LCA and its certification might form a useful component 
of environmental content, particularly as the practice becomes more widespread in the future. On 
a more limited scale, inexpensive LCA software is already available; a company with an EMS 
could use these tools to evaluate its potential for improvements and decide whether to pursue 
production process changes and a more rigorous certification process. Such evaluation might 
also identify low-cost changes might be worthwhile on their own. 
Weighing the Benefits 
With a multiplicity of goals—economic, environmental, and institutional—it is difficult 
for a simple set of common environmental practices or standards to satisfy all points. A second 
question for the design of environmental content for COCs regards the relative importance of the 
different goals, which may guide the choice of content. 
Efficiency Gains 
The IFC Manual for Implementing EMS in SME states, “the primary goal is to help 
businesses use environmental reviews to identify cost-saving measures. It is also intended to be a 
resource for companies to ensure positive environmental impacts while benefiting their own 
organization” (IFC 2004). Some authors argue that product and process standards should be 
considered more proactively as a driver for achieving efficiency gains, by way of improved 
technology, energy efficiency, and recycling inputs (e.g., Porter and van der Linde [1995], who 
theorize that imposing environmental standards can raise profits). Anecdotal evidence is offered 
to support the idea, some from developing countries (Khwaja et al. 2003). Most economists resist 
the notion that the “low-hanging fruits” of costless environmental improvements are widespread, 
                                                 
36 ISO provisions for LCA are newer, and we have not evaluated any evidence regarding the costs and benefits of 
LCA outside of ecolabel conformity. 
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even though these theories are generally predicated on market institutions and incentives in 
developed countries.37 Studies of EMSs have shown some significant savings in terms of 
materials use, but those savings must be properly weighed against the costs of implementation. 
Market Gains 
The argument that efficiency improvements improve environmental performance and 
increase profits remains distinct from the idea that environmentally benign producers can charge 
premium prices or access developed-country markets for their products. Demand for 
standardized content for COCs is likely to arise, directly or indirectly, from the minimum 
expectations of consumers in developed countries. With the increasing availability of and 
demand for information, standards may be perceived as inevitable. It means that the potential for 
charging premium prices in developed countries may well be limited; as standards become more 
common, price premium benefits tend to diminish in importance. Instead, voluntary code 
compliance is more likely to become a basic requirement for access to these markets. 
Thus, the main reason that companies in developing countries would conform to 
environmental content in corporate COCs would be to avoid losing the export markets that 
require compliance. To cushion the costs of compliance, environmental performance demands 
should be coupled with technology and expertise transfer (Manoharan 2000).38 To the extent that 
consumers and regulatory standards in developed countries demand compliance, MNEs could 
meet part of their CSR by providing assistance to improve the environmental performance of 
their subsidiaries and suppliers. 
Judging by the existing COC of major MNEs, EMS certification seems sufficient to 
satisfy most industry CSR requirements and therefore should be sufficient for suppliers to access 
developed-country markets. 
                                                 
37 Palmer et al. (1995) explain why regulation costs are unlikely to be dominated by efficiency gains within the firm. 
Apparent cost savings can often be negated by proper accounting of management time and other human resource 
costs. Although some theories of the firm have been developed to explain how such situations might arise (see 
Sinclair-Desgagné 1999), it is still unclear how widespread these opportunities would be. 
38 Khwaja et al. (2003) offer an example of the role of support networks: working in cooperation with the local San 
Benito Leather Tanners’ Association, the Colombian leather tannery Curtigran Ltd. reduced its operating costs by 
11% and pollution by 50%. 
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Environmental Improvements 
Whereas market benefits arise from perceived behavior, environmental improvements 
arise from real behavioral change. As noted earlier, EMS implementation does not necessarily 
confer environmental benefits, but empirical evidence supports the positive impact of EMSs on 
performance in general. ISO 14001 certification does not in itself promote better behavior except 
in conjunction with the benefits that accompany the credibility boost, which may encourage 
some firms to adopt an EMS in the first place. Information disclosure programs have also been 
shown to encourage better environmental performance, particularly for underperforming firms. 
Although the proposed common content provisions combine to improve incentives for 
performance, they do not guarantee particular outcomes, at least not in excess of lawful 
compliance to regulations. To achieve environmental outcomes with more certainty, performance 
metrics—in addition to process standards—could be incorporated. However, appropriate metrics 
must be developed by industry and by country, which dilutes some of the potential benefits of 
having widespread, streamlined content in a COC. 
More Effective Use of Regulatory Capacity 
Although society benefits from improved performance, host-country regulators benefit to 
the extent that the environmental content of the COC and its certification provides more, better, 
and more credible information than before. When enforcement capacity is limited, improved 
information provision can allow regulators to better allocate resources toward problem polluters. 
Companies that adopt the COC can then, in theory, benefit from reduced regulatory pressure. 
While many experts worry that in the long run voluntary codes may pre-empt more effective 
conventional regulation (Jenkins 2001; Maxwell et al. 1998), a focus on information, especially 
in this context, may pose less of those risks. 
Better information about emissions can foster better designs of regulatory targets and 
mechanisms. For example, reporting mass emissions can facilitate the development of market-
based mechanisms to reduce emissions more cost effectively. However, not all environmental 
content provisions offer the same type and quality of information. For example, EMS 
implementation may signal a higher likelihood of compliance, third-party certification improves 
this signal, and emissions disclosure provides harder data. Certification of more stringent 
performance standards also offers better compliance data. 
56 Resources for the Future  Fischer, Parry, Aguilar, and Jawahar 
Targeting Industries 
The choice of scope and content is inherently intertwined with the question of which 
companies would be targeted for adopting common environmental content in their COCs. From 
our survey of existing company practices, we have gleaned several basic factors that indicate 
circumstances or industries in which standardized environmental content for COCs could have a 
real impact, both benefiting the environment and helping companies meet their corporate 
citizenship goals. 
Demand Pull 
Demand for sustainable practices can arise from consumers, regulations in host or 
consuming countries, or international law. Consumer pressure is likely to be strongest for 
products that will be marketed under major brand names or by major stores, for whom reputation 
is an important asset. It has been an impetus for apparel and footwear, timber, and coffee 
industries and could become important for brand-name manufactured and electronic products. 
For a developing country, “Made in _____” also functions as a brand name, which 
exporting industries have an interest in protecting. These pressures largely apply to exports of 
final goods, like clothing, agricultural products, and some materials for which the origin is noted 
in the final product (like Turkish cotton or Brazilian rosewood). 
Regulations and CSR codes in consuming countries may influence purchasing practices 
and product requirements. A consuming country’s regulations are most likely to cover packaging 
and product characteristics, like safety and recyclability, but such rules do not necessarily 
translate into pressure for cleaner production practices. Ecolabels with life-cycle requirements 
may, however. 
International law governing toxic chemicals (and chlorofluorocarbons [CFCs]) is of 
obvious importance to industries with chemical inputs but could also drive demand for verifiable 
environmental practices if the standards could ease compliance with international regulations. It 
is unclear what impact the Kyoto Protocol, if it comes into effect, will have on GHG emissions 
by companies in developing countries, which do not have binding emissions targets. Although 
developed-country clients might prefer climate-friendly behavior, offering GHG reductions in a 
COC could mean giving up potential benefits and transfers from a clean development 
mechanism project. 
For companies in developing countries, a direct demand pull arises when environmental 
provisions in a CSR code can help them reduce their regulatory burden by signaling to regulators 
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(and to community activists) that enforcement action is less necessary. Local markets are 
unlikely to offer much premium to products from clean producers. Indirect demand pull from 
foreign markets may be strong for certain sectors, but it applies only to exporting firms. Certain 
companies in developed countries that have brand names to protect or their own CSR or ecolabel 
requirements may pass on these expectations to their suppliers. The key questions then become 
•  What environmental behavior is needed to satisfy these green purchasing 
requirements? 
•  How and to what degree is compliance enforced? 
Lack (or Existence?) of Preexisting Industry Code 
The benefits of standardizing environmental content are greater for industries in which 
demand for clean performance has translated into myriad variations in conduct requirements for 
supply chain producers. Should the standard then incorporate the set of the most stringent 
requirements among the client companies to be acceptable, even if it imposed an additional cost 
burden on suppliers catering to fewer clients? A bundle of criteria that reflect a compromise in 
the level of stringency might be acceptable if the greater transparency and verifiability of a 
common code enhances the credibility of the CSR program. 
Industries whose production is so decentralized and dispersed that COCs are not 
developed could also benefit from the mutual adoption and promotion of common standards. It 
would require more organization, but the scale returns to reasonably widespread adoption could 
allow these industries to tap into the market benefits of a CSR program. 
By contrast, other industries may have more centralized production or more transparent 
environmental risks, allowing for heightened consumer awareness and pressure. For example, 
widely publicized accidents turned the public eye on the major players in the highly concentrated 
chemical industry. Stories about rainforest destruction galvanized consumer and interest-group 
attention to the sourcing of wood products. In these sectors, strong demand has already prompted 
the individual industry groups to respond with their own sets of standards. Creating independent, 
standardized environmental provisions for a COC is less likely to be useful if it would substitute 
for or compete with an established industry environmental code. Rather, efforts to formalize 
environmental conduct standards in developing-country industries should be guided by 
established industry standards in developed countries, with an eye toward facilitating their 
adoption. If those standards are unrealistically stringent for developing-country producers, then 
there may be room for a middle tier of common standards—provided that those lesser standards 
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are accepted by consumers. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia are developing their own 
forest certification schemes. 
Scope for Environmental Improvement 
The potential impact of COCs could be strongest in industries that are energy intensive, 
use polluting inputs, or consume natural resources. Host-country governments could indicate 
which of their industries might present the greatest challenges to regulation and which could 
benefit the most from improved incentives for performance and information disclosure. 
Ease of Monitoring 
All of the factors described thus far can help identify industries with the greatest potential 
for benefiting from standardized environmental content for voluntary COCs. To this list, we add 
ease of monitoring, even evidence of serious monitoring activities is limited. Some form of 
reporting is essential to give standards credibility with consumers and other parties; monitoring 
is also essential for a code to have real incentives and meaningful effects on environmental 
outcomes. 
Choosing Partners 
In addition to choosing industries to target, there is a range of choices for partners to help 
develop and promote common environmental content in COCs. This choice will also likely 
impact the content strategy. Host-country governments, the typical client of IFC and the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service, can be useful partners in targeting a particular export industry. 
They can guide the selection of specific performance and reporting criteria according to local 
needs. However, if a performance or perception problem arises primarily from the lack of 
capacity for credibly enforcing their own environmental regulations, they probably will not have 
the capacity to operate a verification system to monitor compliance with the conduct 
requirements. That role must be sought elsewhere. 
NGOs have been active in information-disclosure as well as certification programs and 
may be able to serve a purpose, particularly as third-party monitors. Local industries may have 
sufficient collective resources to promote themselves as good environmental performers and to 
pay third parties to verify their claims, at least if the market benefits are there. However, 
significant assistance would undoubtedly be required to start up the program and cover (or at 
least cushion) many of the initial costs. 
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There may also be substantial opportunities to work with MNEs and industry groups. 
Outsourcing companies can help to streamline supply chain requirements and could themselves 
benefit from a broader base of suppliers that are credible practitioners of good environmental 
behavior. More standardized requirements could offer MNEs lower costs of enforcing their own 
supply chains, if a competitive network of third-party certifiers could evolve. However, it would 
require a rather large group of firms to adopt the common content; for some MNEs, the cost will 
be less specific requirements to address their particular concerns. 
International industry groups can bring to the table their networks, experience, and 
common standards to guide CSR practices and their evaluation in developing countries. These 
associations are often in the best position to disseminate information among their members and 
to promote their collective compliance. However, industry groups dominated by particular 
subsectors may also bring along their own agendas. 
Our case study on forest certification (Fischer et al. 2005) discusses some of the roles and 
challenges of these different partners. The forestry sector is particularly interesting because of its 
multiple certification schemes and its economic importance in several developing countries. The 
study highlights some important challenges to establishing credible and beneficial certification 
schemes in resource sectors in developing countries. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In summary, to have a COC is essentially to signal information. To maximize the value 
of that information to stakeholders and the impact on the environment, the information must be 
meaningful, of good quality, and easily available. The experience of information-based programs 
such as emissions disclosure and ecolabeling reveal some common themes to add to those 
gleaned from the history of existing corporate COCs. 
First, the benefits of information rely on the ability and readiness of consumers, 
environmental and community organizations, and regulators to understand and access the 
information and then use it to put pressure on corporate managers. The environmental 
requirements of the code should be transparent, and performance indicators and other data to 
verify compliance should be publicly accessible. Harnessing the power of important stakeholder 
groups to communicate findings can help promote social responsibility and deter evasion. 
Second, the credibility of this information is essential, and it is best established by third-
party verification. To this end, standard content is beneficial, because it allows for the emergence 
of a larger pool of independent verifiers that operate with common standards of their own. 
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Third, the perceived quality of the information is enhanced when independent bodies (as 
opposed to industry groups or individual companies) establish the requirements for voluntary 
schemes. This means that common environmental content has the potential to add value relative 
to sector or individual corporate codes. That said, even at their greatest, the market benefits 
cannot be guaranteed to outweigh the costs of implementation, compliance, and verification. 
To be generally applicable, a set of feasible common provisions must focus on process 
and principles rather than performance. This content could include compliance with relevant 
laws and regulations, EMS implementation, third-party certification, and public reporting of 
environmental performance measures. The ISO 14001 system offers a respected template for 
EMSs as well as an established network of certifiers. Although reasonable evidence is emerging 
that these general steps can produce some meaningful results, they are not guaranteed. As such, 
provisions that are sufficiently broad as to be feasible for common application may not be fully 
satisfying.  
More specific environmental content—including performance measures—would need to 
be determined by industry, or at least by country, or both. Consequently, before proceeding with 
designing common content, important choices must be made regarding the appropriate scope of 
the environmental content, the target industry, the relative priority of economic and 
environmental goals, and the partners available to help implement the program. 
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Appendix 
Acronyms 
CCPA  Canada’s Chemical Producers Asociation 
CFC chlorofluorocarbon 
CO2   carbon dioxide 
COC  code of conduct 
CSR  corporate social responsibility 
EMAS  Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (European Union) 
EMS   environmental management system 
EPCRA  Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (United States) 
ESM  environmentally sound management 
GEN  Global Ecolabelling Network 
GHG greenhouse  gas 
IFC  International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group 
ILO  International Labour Organization 
ISO International  Organization for Standardization 
LCA  life-cycle assessment 
MNE multinational  enterprise 
NGO   nongovernmental organization 
NOx nitrogen  oxides 
ODS  ozone-depleting substance 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PROPER   Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation, and Rating (Indonesia) 
PRTR   pollutant release and transfer registry 
SO2 sulfur  dioxide 
TRI   Toxic Release Inventory (United States) 
UNCED   United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
U.S. EPA  Environmental Protection Agency (United States) 
WTO  World Tourism Organization 
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   EMS: 
ISO 14001:1996  1996  Specification with Guidance for Use 
ISO 14004:1996   1996  General Guidelines on Principles, Systems, and Supporting 
Techniques 
   Guidelines for Environmental Auditing: 
ISO 14010:1996   1996  General Principles 
ISO 14011:1996   1996  Audit Procedures—Auditing of EMSs 
ISO 14012:1996   1996  Qualification Criteria for Environmental Auditors 
ISO 19011:2002
a  2002  Guidelines for Quality and/or EMSs Auditing  
   Environmental Labels and Declarations: 
ISO 14020:2000   2000  General Principles 
ISO 14021:1999   1999  Self-Declared Environmental Claims (Type II environmental 
labeling) 
ISO 14024:1999   1999  Type I Environmental Labeling—Principles and Procedures 
ISO/TR 14025:2000   2000  Type III Environmental Declarations 
   Environmental Management: 
ISO 14015:2001   2001  Environmental Assessment of Sites and Organizations (EASO) 
ISO 14031:1999   1999  Environmental Performance Evaluation—Guidelines 
ISO/TR 14032:1999  1999  Examples of Environmental Performance Evaluation (EPE) 
ISO 14050:2002   2002  Vocabulary 
ISO/TR 14062:2002   2002  Environmental Management: Integrating Environmental Aspects 
into Product Design and Development 
   Environmental Management: LCA 
ISO 14040:1997   1997  Principles and Framework 
ISO 14041:1998   1998  Goal and Scope Definition and Inventory Analysis 
ISO 14042:2000   2000  Life-Cycle Impact Assessment 
ISO 14043:2000   2000  Life-Cycle Interpretation 
ISO/TR 14047   2003  Examples of Application of ISO 14042 
ISO/TS 14048:2002   2002  Data Documentation Format 
ISO/TR 14049:2000   2000  Examples of Application of ISO 14041 to Goal and Scope 
Definition and Inventory Analysis 
   (Other) 
ISO/TR 14061:1998   1998  Information to Assist Forestry Organizations in the Use of the EMS 
Standards ISO14001 and ISO 14004 






1999  General Requirements for Bodies Operating Assessment and 
Certification/Registration of EMS 
a This standard replaces ISO 14010, 14011 and 14012. 
Sources: ISO 2002, 2004b. 
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Table of Major Ecolabels 
















Launched to provide the community an environmental mark of 
recognition for a range of products. Program was developed 
for general compliance with ISO 14024 and is managed by the 










ECP was created as a voluntary ecolabeling program by 
Environment Canada. Its relationship with industry has 
evolved from confrontational to collaborative. TerraChoice 
has officially managed ECP since 1995. Apart from expanding 
guidelines and privatization, program scope has extended from 











China State Bureau of Technical Supervision approved the 
establishment of the China Certification Committee for 
Environmental Labeling to administer the program; define the 
policy, principles, and rules of the program; propose product 










Scheme was launched under the management the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and Physical Planning 
(http://www.mzopu.hr/default.aspx?id=5145). With 
participation of experts and public stakeholders, the program 
has developed ecolabel criteria for returnable packaging, 
waste collection, secondary raw material (recycled) products, 
products free from asbestos (and other toxic substances), and 






The label was created to provide a consistent E.U. ecolabel 
scheme, with the same criteria applying for the same product, 
regardless of the member state in which it is produced or sold. 
Its logo is referred to as the E.U. Flower. 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/ecolabel/index_en 
.htm) 
  2000  Scheme was comprehensively revised. Label can be issued to 
manufacturers, importers, service providers, traders, or 
retailers. Established product groups include cleaning 
products, appliances, paper products, home and garden items, 
clothing, tourism, and lubricants. 















Label development began in 1989, but because of initial 
industry opposition, program was not fully operational until 
1992. This life-cycle–based ecolabel was developed through a 
consultation process that involved the government, 











Ecolabel set up by the Umweltbundesamt (the German 
environment agency) and guided by a jury that reviews 
proposals for product ecolabels. Jury consists of 
representatives from industry, environmental organizations, 
consumer associations, trade unions, churches, and public 
authorities to ensure that interests of various groups in society 
are considered. Other involved institutions are the German 
Institute for Quality Assurance and Certification (RAL) and 
the Federal Environmental Agency. Blue Angel was the first 
and is the oldest environment-related label for products and 









Scheme was launched to identify environment-friendly 
products. Any product that is made, used, or disposed of in a 
way that significantly reduces the harm it would otherwise 
cause the environment can be considered an environment-
friendly product. 
(http://envfor.nic.in/cpcb/ecomark/ecomark.html) 






Initially a product standard for which criteria were set by the 
organization, the program now seeks to disseminate 
information about the environmental aspects of products and 
encourages consumers to choose them “for an ecological 
lifestyle and, ultimately, an environmentally sound society.” 
(http://www.ecomark.jp/english/) 
 1996  Program procedures were revised to conform to ISO 14024 
standards. Currently, they include life-cycle analysis, 
consultation with related parties, and public review of draft 
criteria. 










Created in line with ISO 14024 for an environmental labeling, 
declaration, and certification system. It has developed criteria 
for seven product categories: office products, construction and 
housing products, living necessities, home appliances and 
furniture, transportation and leisure-related products, industrial 
equipment and supplies, and multipurpose and others. 
(http://www.kela.or.kr/english) 

















Program was created following a government proposal to 
establish a voluntary ecolabeling scheme. It meets ISO 14020, 






Ministry of Economic Affairs created the Stichting Milieukeur 
environmental labeling program 
(http://www.milieukeur.nl/english/), the Dutch competent 








AENOR, a private independent body dedicated to developing 
standards and certification and enhancing social well-being 
and the environment, acts as the competent body for awarding 
the E.U. Eco-label in Spain. AENOR is a GEN member, 
participates in developing ISO ecolabeling standards, and has 
established criteria for the labeling of certain products and 
facilities in Spain. 
(http://www.aenor.es/desarrollo/certificacion/productos/tipo.as










An independent multinational ecolabeling scheme. Only 
products that satisfy strict environmental requirements on the 
basis of objective assessments are approved. Assessment 
considers the product’s life-cycle environmental impact. 
Program sets criteria for quality and performance and has 











three large retail 
chains in 
Sweden, 1988 
The Swedish Society for Nature Conservation and Eco-
labelling formed in 1909 and the largest environmental NGO 
in Sweden, has a long history of environmental protection and 
has developed considerable influence and credibility. Strong 
demand for environmental information created incentive for a 
commercially independent, unbiased, environmental label 
(http://www.snf.se/bmv/english.cfm). The green peregrine 
falcon logo has been used since 1992. 






















Program was launched by Taiwan’s EPA but is currently 
administrated by EDF, an independent private organization. 
(http://greenmark.epa.gov.tw/english/index.asp#A)  
Green Mark had developed criteria for 41 product categories 
and certified 451 products by 1997. By 2003, the program had 
established 80 criteria that have resulted in 2,000 certified 
products according to the Taiwanese EPA’s Bureau of 
Performance Evaluation and Dispute Settlement and has 
achieved label recognition by national ecolabel programs in 







Thailand Environment Institute, a local environmental NGO 
that cooperates closely with the Thai Ministry of Industry, 
developed the scheme (http://www.tei.or.th/greenlabel/). 
Criteria include life-cycle analysis, waste reduction, and 
energy and water conservation. Standards apply to energy-
saving fluorescent lamps, products made from recycled 
plastics, environmentally sound refrigerators, low-pollutant 
emulsion paints, water-economizing flush toilets, mercury-free 
dry-cell batteries, recycled paper, low-energy air conditioners, 





Independent nonprofit organization 
(http://www.greenseal.org) sets environmental standards, 
certifies products that meet those standards, and educates 
consumers on how buying decisions can help the environment. 
Development involves environmental organizations, consumer 
groups, manufacturers, and government agencies. Certified 
products include newsprint, household cleaners, paints, 
fluorescent lightbulbs, and water-efficient fixtures. Green Seal 
meets the criteria for ISO 14020, ISO 14024, and U.S. EPA’s 
third-party certifiers of environmentally preferable products.  
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